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DISCLAIMER 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government.  Neither
the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors,
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responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any third party’s use or the results of such use of any information,
apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
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or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United
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ACRONYMS 
CHF Canister Handling Facility 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
DPC dual-purpose canister 
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SSCs structures, systems, and components 
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WNNRF  Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility 
WP waste package 
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1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this report is to identify and document the nuclear safety design requirements that 
are specific to structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of the repository that are important to 
safety (ITS) during the preclosure period and to support the preclosure safety analysis and the 
license application for the high-level radioactive waste (HLW) repository at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada.  The scope of this report includes the assignment of nuclear safety design requirements 
to SSCs that are ITS and does not include the assignment of design requirements to SSCs or 
natural or engineered barriers that are important to waste isolation (ITWI). 
These requirements are used as input for the design of the SSCs that are ITS such that the 
preclosure performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273] are met.  The natural or 
engineered barriers that are important to meeting the postclosure performance objectives 
of 10 CFR 63.113(b) and (c) [DIRS 173273] are identified as ITWI.  Although a structure, 
system, or component (SSC) that is ITS may also be ITWI, this report is only concerned with 
providing the nuclear safety requirements for SSCs that are ITS to prevent or mitigate event 
sequences during the repository preclosure period.   
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
As established using information presented in Section 2 of Quality Assurance Requirements and 
Description (DOE 2004 [DIRS 171539]), this report is subject to quality assurance program 
requirements because the design bases that are identified are applicable to items classified as ITS 
as defined by 10 CFR 63.2 [DIRS 173273].  This report was developed in accordance with 
procedures LP-3.11Q-BSC, Technical Reports and LP-3.13Q-BSC, Design Control.  Input data 
are identified and tracked in accordance with LP-3.15Q-BSC, Managing Technical Product 
Inputs. 
3. USE OF SOFTWARE 
No software required to be qualified under LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Software Management, was used for 
any part of this analysis.  The text of this report is printed using Microsoft Word and is exempted 
from the requirements of LP-SI.11Q-BSC per Section 2.1.1 of the procedure. 
4. DESIGN INPUTS 
4.1 TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
4.1.1. In this analysis the acronym for the Dry Transfer Facility (DTF) represents both DTF 1 
and DTF 2 and implies that the same systems and components are located within both 
DTF 1 and DTF 2.  Basis:  Two identical DTFs are planned.  Initially, only one will be 
constructed and operated.  Throughput requirements will determine the timing of 
construction and operation of the second DTF (BSC 2005e [DIRS 174255], Section 
1.1).   
4.1.2 Safety Classification of SSCs and Barriers (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A) 
establishes the safety classification of the SSCs that are ITS.  Basis:  This input is 
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appropriate for use because it represents the latest safety classification information 
available for this report. 
 
4.1.3 Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7) establishes the categorization (as Category 1, Category 2, or 
Beyond Category 2) of the internal and external event sequences that may occur before 
permanent closure of the repository at Yucca Mountain.  Basis:  This input is 
appropriate for use because it represents the latest event sequence categorization 
information available for this report. 
4.1.4 Preclosure Consequence Analyses for License Application (BSC 2005c [DIRS 
174261], Sections 6 and 7) identify the functions that are credited for mitigation of a 
radiological release.  Basis:  This input is appropriate for use because it provides the 
consequences of potential event sequences and identifies the SSCs required to mitigate 
the consequences of event sequences in order to comply with the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273].  
4.1.5 Fire-Induced Event Sequence Analysis (BSC 2005g [DIRS 174263], Section 7) 
describes the SSCs relied upon for prevention or mitigation of identified fire-induced 
event sequences.  Basis:  This input is appropriate for use because it provides the basis 
for design requirements that are required to mitigate the consequences of fire-induced 
event sequences in order to comply with the performance objectives of 10 CFR 
63.111(b) [DIRS 173273].  
4.1.6 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis (BSC 2005h [DIRS 174429], 
Section 9) describes the SSCs relied upon for prevention or mitigation of identified 
event sequences.  Basis:  This input is appropriate for use because it provides the basis 
for design requirements that are required to mitigate the consequences of event 
sequences associated with extreme winds, tornadoes, and tornado missile hazards in 
order to comply with the performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273].  
4.1.7 Monitored Geologic Repository External Events Hazards Screening Analysis (BSC 
2005d [DIRS 174235], Section 6) describes the SSCs relied upon for prevention or 
mitigation of identified event sequences.  Basis:  This input is appropriate for use 
because it provides the basis for design requirements that are required to mitigate the 
consequences of event sequences associated with external events in order to comply 
with the performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273].  
4.1.8 Reliability Analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution System to Selected Portions of 
the Nuclear HVAC System (BSC 2004c [DIRS 171490], Table 9) describes the SSCs 
relied upon for prevention or mitigation of identified event sequences.  Basis:  This 
input is appropriate for use because it provides the basis for the design requirements 
that are required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of event sequences associated 
with the electrical power system in order to comply with the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273].  
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4.1.9 Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Section 4) 
describes the functions of SSCs relied upon for prevention or mitigation of identified 
event sequences.  Basis:  This input is appropriate for use because it provides the basis 
for the design requirements that are required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of 
event sequences associated with seismic events in order to comply with the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273].  
4.1.10 System architecture is established by “Facility, Equipment and System Names for Use 
in the SAR” (Lucas 2004 [DIRS 170073], Attachments 8 and 9).  Basis:  This input is 
appropriate for use because it represents the latest design information and system 
architecture available for the repository.  
4.1.11 Although the Remediation Facility is listed separately in the system architecture 
provided in Lucas (2004 [DIRS 170073], Attachments 8 and 9), it now included as an 
integral part of the DTF and will not exist as a separate facility.  Basis:  The 
Remediation Facility is integrated within the DTF and provides the space, layout, 
structures, and embedded systems needed to recover from off-normal conditions during 
waste-handling operations (e.g., a damaged transportation cask, fuel form, or waste 
package [WP]) (BSC 2005e [DIRS 174255], Section 1.1).  
4.2 CRITERIA 
Federal Regulations 
The safety classification criteria used in this report are those provided in 10 CFR 63.2 [DIRS 
173273] for important to safety.  Transportation casks received at the repository comply with 
requirements of 10 CFR 71.55 [DIRS 173375], which states that casks are to be subcritical even 
with most reactive credible configuration of fissile material and moderation to the most reactive 
credible extent, and the design bases of 10 CFR 71.73 [DIRS 173375].  Event sequence 
categorization methodology is based on the 10 CFR 63.2 definition of event sequence.   
5. ANALYSIS 
5.1 METHOD 
A distinction is made between the repository design bases and the 10 CFR 63.2 [DIRS 173273] 
design bases for SSCs that are ITS.  All SSCs have design bases; however, only SSCs that are 
ITS have design bases as defined by 10 CFR 63.2.  These 10 CFR 63.2 design bases are required, 
pursuant to 10 CFR 63.112 [DIRS 173273], to be included in the preclosure safety analysis of 
the license application for a repository at Yucca Mountain.   
The preclosure safety analysis of the license application provides a safety assessment of the 
10 CFR 63.2 repository design bases.  The 10 CFR 63.2 design bases and the supporting design 
information are subjected to design control and the other quality assurance criteria of 10 CFR 
63.142 [DIRS 173273].   
The methodology for developing the 10 CFR 63.2 design bases are summarized in the following 
paragraphs. 
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The Category 1, Category 2, and Beyond Category 2 event sequences derived from the internal, 
external, and other applicable hazards analyses (such as fire hazards analysis, extreme 
wind/tornado wind/tornado missile hazard analysis, etc.) are identified.  The list of Category 1, 
Category 2, and Beyond Category 2 event sequences forms a part of the repository licensing 
bases and appears in the license application.  Each Category 1, Category 2, and Beyond Category 
2 event sequence involves SSCs that are evaluated within the preclosure safety analysis to assess 
the likelihood and consequences of an event sequence leading to a dose that exceeds the 10 CFR 
63.111(b) [DIRS 173273] preclosure performance objectives.  These SSCs may change as the 
design matures.  Changes in the list of event sequences result in a reassessment of affected SSCs 
and associated 10 CFR 63.2 design bases.  Design iterations, design improvements, or design 
modifications could potentially lead to changes in the list of event sequences and associated 
SSCs throughout the licensing process and beyond. 
Compliance with the 10 CFR 63.111(b) performance objectives for Category 1 and Category 2 
event sequences is significantly different for each category.  Category 1 event sequence 
compliance assessments are based on annual performance requirements that require an 
aggregation of releases.  A Category 2 event sequence compliance assessment is made on a per-
event basis.  No aggregation of releases is made for Category 2 event sequences.  Because of 
these compliance differences, the design bases for SSCs that are ITS involved in Category 2 
event sequences are developed before the design bases associated with the Category 1 event 
sequences.  ITS SSCs may be required to ensure that an event sequence is categorized as Beyond 
Category 2. 
The set of SSCs that has been classified as ITS based on the Category 1 and Category 2 event 
sequences is identified.  In addition, those SSCs credited for ensuring that an event sequence is 
categorized as Beyond Category 2 are identified.  These SSCs that have been classified as ITS 
require 10 CFR 63.2 design bases to be established. 
A single SSC is then chosen from the set of SSCs classified as ITS and the Category 1, 
Category 2, and Beyond Category 2 event sequences that credit the function of that SSC are 
identified from the applicable supporting analyses. 
For the selected SSC that is ITS, the Category 2 and Beyond Category 2 10 CFR 63.2 design 
bases are developed.  This selection process is repeated until the SSCs that are ITS have 
10 CFR 63.2 design bases developed for each of the Category 2 and Beyond Category 2 event 
sequences. 
After the design bases for the Category 2 and Beyond Category 2 event sequences are identified, 
an SSC that is ITS for meeting the Category 1 performance objective is selected.  The 10 CFR 
63.2 design bases for the SSC that is ITS that meet the 10 CFR 63.111(b) preclosure 
performance objectives for Category 1 event sequences are then selected.  This process is 
repeated until 10 CFR 63.2 design bases are established for the SSCs that are ITS in the 
Category 1 event sequences. 
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5.2 ARCHITECTURE 
The repository is comprised of the following facilities (Lucas 2004 [DIRS 170073], Attachments 
8 and 9): 
1. Balance of Plant Facility  
2. Canister Handling Facility (CHF) 
3. DTF 
4. Fuel Handling Facility (FHF) 
5. Subsurface Facility  
6. Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility (TCRRF) 
7. Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility (WNNRF). 
Although the Remediation Facility is listed separately in the system architecture provided in 
“Facility, Equipment and System Names for Use in the SAR” (Lucas 2004 [DIRS 170073], 
Attachments 8 and 9), it has since been included as an integral part of the DTF and does not exist 
as a separate facility. 
Repository systems are subdivided into process systems and infrastructure systems.  Process 
systems include systems that involve primary processes in the waste handling and waste isolation 
systems while the infrastructure systems are those systems that are needed to provide support to 
the process systems and the facilities.  Process and infrastructure systems exist and operate in 
multiple facilities.   
The repository waste handling systems are evaluated to determine the applicability of 
Category 1, Category 2, and Beyond Category 2 event sequences associated with preclosure 
operations (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467]).  The Balance of Plant facilities have no Category 1, 
Category 2, or Beyond Category 2 event sequences associated with preclosure operations (BSC 
2005b [DIRS 174467]).  The remaining repository facilities and the repository process systems 
that are present in these facilities include the following (Lucas 2004 [DIRS 170073], 
Attachments 8 and 9): 
• Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility 
- Cask Receipt and Return System 
 
• Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility 
- DOE and Commercial Waste Package System 
- Naval Waste Package System 
- Non-Nuclear Handling System 
 
• Dry Transfer Facility 
- DOE and Commercial Waste Package System 
- Naval Waste Package System 
- Cask Receipt and Return System 
- Non-Nuclear Handling System 
- Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System 
 - SNF/HLW Transfer System 
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- Waste Package Closure System 
- Remediation System 
- Emplacement and Retrieval System 
- SNF Aging System 
 
• Canister Handling Facility 
- DOE and Commercial Waste Package System 
- Naval Waste Package System 
- Cask Receipt and Return System 
- Non-Nuclear Handling System 
- Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System 
- SNF/HLW Transfer System 
- Waste Package Closure System 
- Emplacement and Retrieval System 
- SNF Aging System 
 
• Fuel Handling Facility  
- DOE and Commercial Waste Package System 
- Naval Waste Package System 
- Cask Receipt and Return System 
- Non-Nuclear Handling System 
- Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System 
- SNF/HLW Transfer System 
- Waste Package Closure System 
- Emplacement and Retrieval System 
- SNF Aging System 
 
• Subsurface Facility 
- DOE and Commercial Waste Package System 
- Naval Waste Package System 
- Emplacement and Retrieval System 
- SNF Aging System 
 
The applicable repository facility and process system SSCs provided in this report are presented 
with their corresponding 10 CFR 63.2 design bases. 
5.3 CATEGORIZATION OF EVENT SEQUENCES 
An event sequence is defined by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be “a series of 
actions and/or occurrences within the natural and engineered components of a geologic 
repository operations area that could potentially lead to exposure of individuals to radiation” 
(10 CFR 63.2).  Event sequences that are “expected to occur one or more times before permanent 
closure of the geologic repository operations area are referred to as Category 1 event sequences” 
(10 CFR 63.2).  “Other event sequences that have at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring 
before permanent closure are referred to as Category 2 event sequences” (10 CFR 63.2).  Less 
likely event sequences are considered Beyond Category 2.  An event that has no potential for 
“exposure of individuals to radiation” is not considered an event sequence. 
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The initial step of the process for determining the 10 CFR Part 63.2 design bases involves 
determining the Category 1, Category 2, and Beyond Category 2 event sequences.  These event 
sequences are identified in the internal, external, and other applicable hazards analyses.  
Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467]) 
establishes the categorization (as Category 1, Category 2, or Beyond Category 2) of the internal 
and external event sequences that may occur before permanent closure of the repository at Yucca 
Mountain.   
5.4 CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 
Safety Classification of SSCs and Barriers (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836]) establishes the safety 
classification of the repository SSCs.  If an SSC is determined to be ITS or ITWI, then it is 
classified as safety category (SC).  An SSC can be ITS, ITWI, both, or neither.  If an SSC is 
neither ITS nor ITWI, it is classified as Non-SC.  The safety classifications of the repository 
SSCs, as established in Safety Classification of SSCs and Barriers (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836]), 
are reproduced in the tables found in Appendix A of this analysis.  The set of SSCs that have 
been classified as ITS based on the Category 1 and Category 2 event sequences, as well as those 
SSCs credited for ensuring that an event sequence is categorized as Beyond Category 2, are 
identified. 
5.5 EVENT SEQUENCE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
The worker and offsite radiation doses were calculated in Preclosure Consequence Analyses for 
License Application (BSC 2005c [DIRS 174261], Section 7) for the event sequences identified in 
Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467], 
Section 7).  In addition, any mitigative functions performed by ITS SSCs that are credited in the 
dose calculations are identified (such as high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA] filters). 
5.6 DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN BASES 
The development of the 10 CFR 63.2 design bases follows the methodology described in Section 
5.1 using the inputs described in Section 4.1.  
The repository facilities, and the repository process systems that are present in these facilities, 
are listed in the following subsections based on the repository architecture described in 
Section 5.2.  The facilities and systems that have Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that 
require SSCs to perform prevention or mitigation functions are identified.  In some instances, 10 
CFR 63.2 design bases are developed for SSCs that provide prevention functions to ensure that 
the frequency of an event sequence is Beyond Category 2.   
The 10 CFR 63.2 design bases (the nuclear safety design bases) for the repository facilities, 
systems, subsystems, and selected SSCs that are developed using the methodology described in 
Section 5.1 are presented in Tables A-I and A-II of Appendix A. 
5.6.1 Facilities 
The facilities include the following: the Balance of Plant Facility, CHF, DTF, FHF, Subsurface 
Facility, TCRRF, and the WNNRF (Lucas 2004 [DIRS 170073], Attachments 8 and 9).  The 
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safety categories for these facilities are shown in Attachment A of Safety Classification of SSCs 
and Barriers (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836]). 
5.6.1.1 Balance of Plant Facility 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
the facilities that comprise the Balance of Plant Facility to perform prevention or mitigation 
functions.  The switchgear facility contains portions of the electrical power system that are ITS.  
Although the structure contains ITS components, there are no event sequences identified that 
prevent the ITS components from performing their ITS function.  No Balance of Plant facility is 
required to function to protect an ITS or ITWI SSC or natural or engineered barrier.  The safety 
category of the facility is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are no 
nuclear safety design bases associated with the Balance of Plant Facility. 
5.6.1.2 Canister Handling Facility 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are Category 2 event sequences that could occur in this facility and 
there are features of the facility that are ITS for prevention or mitigation of event sequences.  The 
Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has 
identified potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  This 
facility contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that 
are ITWI.  The safety category of this facility is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  
Table A-I in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the CHF. 
5.6.1.3 Dry Transfer Facility 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7) and Preclosure Consequence Analysis for License Application (BSC 2005c 
[DIRS 174261], Section 7), there are Category 1 and Category 2 event sequences that could 
occur in this facility and there are features of the facility that are ITS for prevention or mitigation 
of event sequences.  Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], 
Attachment III) has identified potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired 
consequences.  This facility contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or 
engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The safety category of this facility is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 
174836], Attachment A).  Table A-I in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases 
associated with the DTF. 
5.6.1.4 Fuel Handling Facility 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7) and the Preclosure Consequence Analysis for License Application (BSC 
2005c [DIRS 174261], Section 7), there are Category 1 and Category 2 event sequences that 
could occur in this facility and there are features of the facility that are ITS for prevention or 
mitigation of event sequences.  The Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 
171470], Attachment III) has identified potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to 
undesired consequences.  This facility contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or 
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natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The safety category of this facility is SC (BSC 
2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  Table A-I in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety 
design bases associated with the FHF. 
5.6.1.5 Subsurface Facility 
The Subsurface Facility provides space for the emplacement, postemplacement, and subsurface 
development activities.  The facility isolates the radioactive material from the environment and 
monitors the underground area.  The Subsurface Facility includes the portals, ramps, access 
mains and rail, turnouts, emplacement drifts (including the ground support, invert structures and 
ballast, waste package emplacement pallet, drip shield, and, if used, backfill), exhaust mains, 
shafts and raises, shaft and raise access drifts, alcoves, and performance confirmation areas.  The 
facility includes the surface structures at the shafts and raises, and closure seals and plugs (BSC 
2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.1.5).  The safety category of the Subsurface Facility is SC 
(BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A). 
Components associated with the emplacement activity include the emplacement drift invert, drip 
shield, drip shield emplacement gantry, emplacement drift, nonemplacement openings, ground 
support, surface structures at shafts and raises, and waste package emplacement pallets (BSC 
2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.1.5). 
Nonemplacement openings used for subsurface waste emplacement transporter routes during the 
preclosure period, such as portals, ramps, access mains, and turnouts, are ITS because the rock 
properties and drift layout dimensions are used as input for analysis of rockfalls that could 
damage a waste package (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.1.5). 
During postclosure, the emplacement drifts are part of the upper natural barrier that must be 
designed and constructed to specification to ensure that thermal hydrologic properties, and layout 
functions and size, perform consistently with the emplacement drift modeling used in rockfall 
and drift analyses (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.1.5).  
Ground support in emplacement drifts or nonemplacement openings is not considered in rockfall 
models.  The rock blocks predicted are those that fail in an unsupported opening.  During the 
preclosure period this approach leads to a conservative prediction of rock blocks (i.e., more 
blocks are predicted to fail in the model than would otherwise be supported and remain stable 
with ground support).  During the postclosure period, it is realistic to not include ground support 
in rockfall models because ground support will degrade and eventually fail.  Therefore, ground 
support is not ITS or ITWI (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.1.5). 
During preclosure operations, the waste package emplacement pallet provides structural support 
to protect the waste package from damage during surface handling operations and emplacement.  
During the preclosure and postclosure periods, the waste package emplacement pallet prevents 
the waste package from coming into contact with the emplacement drift invert and, therefore, 
mitigates direct exposure to moisture in the invert that may induce corrosion of the waste 
package (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.1.5). 
During the postclosure period, the drip shield protects a waste package from rockfall 
and redirects seepage that flows into the drift, away from the waste package.  The drip shield has 
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no preclosure function.  During the postclosure period, the emplacement drift invert ballast limits 
diffusive transport of radionuclides out of engineered barriers by maintaining unsaturated 
conditions under a waste package and by limiting advective and diffusive transport of 
radionuclides by sorption onto crushed tuff.  The emplacement drift invert (steel and ballast) has 
no ITS preclosure function (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.1.5). 
Preclosure functions of the emplacement drift and the waste package emplacement pallet are 
ITS; postclosure functions of the waste package emplacement pallet, drip shield, emplacement 
drift invert ballast, and emplacement drift are ITWI.  The safety category of the emplacement 
activity is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There is no Category 1 or 
Category 2 event sequence that requires SSCs in the emplacement activity to perform prevention 
or mitigation functions (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467], Section 7).  The Seismic Analysis for 
Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has identified potential 
seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences. 
The postemplacement activities include closure, performance confirmation, and thermal 
management.  The closure function has no preclosure application; closure of the repository 
occurs at the end of the preclosure period.  The closure function limits the number of WPs 
impacted by an intrusive igneous event by preventing magma that has entered an emplacement 
drift via an intersecting dike from flowing into other emplacement drifts because of backfill 
placed in access mains, exhaust mains, turnouts, and magma bulkheads.  Borehole seals and 
ramps, shaft, and raise seals are not considered further in the total system performance 
assessment because of low consequence and are not ITWI (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], 
Attachment A).  There is no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequence that requires an SSC in the 
postemplacement activity to perform a preclosure prevention or mitigation function (BSC 2005b 
[DIRS 174467], Section 7).  Closure items in the postemplacement activity perform postclosure 
prevention or mitigation functions and are ITWI.  The postemplacement activity does not include 
ITS SSCs; it does include ITWI SSCs or natural or engineered barriers.  The safety category of 
the postemplacement activity is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A). 
The subsurface development activities consist of excavation and providing ground support for 
nonemplacement and emplacement areas, as appropriate.  The subsurface development activity is 
not associated with spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or HLW (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], 
Section 6.3.1.5).  There is no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequence that requires an SSC in 
the subsurface development activity to perform a prevention or mitigation function (BSC 2005b 
[DIRS 174467], Section 7).  Therefore, the subsurface development activity does not include ITS 
SSCs, or ITWI SSCs or natural or engineered barriers.  The safety category of the subsurface 
development activity is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A). 
The nuclear safety design bases associated with the Subsurface Facility and its subsystems are 
presented in Table A-I in Appendix A. 
5.6.1.6 Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), Category 2 event sequences could occur in the TCRRF and there are 
features of the facility that are ITS for prevention or mitigation of event sequences.  The Seismic 
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Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has identified 
potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  This facility 
contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that are 
ITWI.  The safety category of this facility is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  
Table A-I in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the TCRRF. 
5.6.1.7 Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
the WNNRF to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this facility consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this facility is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).   
5.6.2 Waste Process and Infrastructure Systems 
5.6.2.1 Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are Category 2 event sequences that could occur in this system and 
there are features of the system that are ITS for prevention or mitigation of event sequences.  The 
Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has 
identified potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  This 
system contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that 
are ITWI.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836] Attachment A).  
Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the 
Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System. 
5.6.2.2 Cask Receipt and Return System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are Category 2 event sequences that could occur in this system and 
there are features of the system that are ITS for prevention or mitigation of event sequences.  
This system consists of SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or engineered 
barriers that are ITWI.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], 
Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated 
with the Cask Receipt and Return System. 
5.6.2.3 Communications System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Communications System. 
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5.6.2.4 Digital Control and Management Information System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Digital Control and Management Information 
System. 
5.6.2.5 DOE and Commercial Waste Package System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), a Category 2 event sequence that requires the WP to perform prevention or 
mitigation functions could occur (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467], Section 5.1.3).  The Seismic 
Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has identified 
potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  The WP 
functions during the preclosure and postclosure periods result in the WP being identified as ITS 
and ITWI, respectively (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.2.5).  The safety category of 
this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A 
presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the DOE and Commercial Waste 
Package System. 
5.6.2.6 Electrical Power System  
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7]), there are Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require a function 
or functions of the surface nuclear heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system for 
mitigation of Category 1 event sequences (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467], Section 7).  Portions of 
the switchyard, normal power, and emergency power subsystems are required for operation and 
support of the surface nuclear HVAC system in the DTF and FHF to maintain doses within the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273].  The electrical power system 
supports the availability of the switchyard, normal power, and emergency power to mitigate the 
consequences of an event sequence.  It includes ITS SSCs; it does not include ITWI SSCs or 
natural or engineered barriers.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 
174836], Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases 
associated with the Electrical Power System. 
5.6.2.7 Electrical Support System 
As described in Safety Classification of SSCs and Barriers (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], 
Section 6.3.2.7), this system provides electrical support for construction and operation of the 
surface and subsurface facilities, including ITS functions of the surface nuclear HVAC system.  
Portions of the cable raceway subsystem that support the availability of electrical power to 
mitigate the consequences of an event sequence are ITS.  SSCs in the remaining portions of the 
electrical support system do not prevent or mitigate the consequences of a Category 1 or 
Category 2 event sequence.  This system includes ITS SSCs; it does not include ITWI SSCs or 
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natural or engineered barriers.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 
174836], Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases 
associated with the Electrical Support System. 
5.6.2.8 Emplacement and Retrieval System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are Category 2 event sequences that could occur in this system and 
there are features of the system that are ITS for prevention or mitigation of event sequences.  The 
Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has 
identified potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  This 
system contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that 
are ITWI.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  
Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the 
Emplacement and Retrieval System. 
5.6.2.9 Environmental/Meteorological Monitoring System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Environmental/Meteorological Monitoring 
System. 
5.6.2.10 Fire Protection System 
This system protects the North Portal area, subsurface emplacement area, and Balance of Plant 
facilities and consists of the explosion protection subsystem, the fire alarm subsystem, the fire 
barriers subsystem, the fire detection subsystem, the fire suppression subsystem, and the fire 
water subsystem (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.2.10). 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 5), to prevent inadvertent criticality in moderator controlled SNF handling 
areas, portions of the fire suppression subsystem are isolated prior to fissile material entering the 
area.  The manual isolation valves for the double-interlock preaction sprinklers of the fire 
suppression subsystem located in moderator controlled areas that are relied upon for this purpose 
are ITS.  There are no SSCs associated with the other fire protection subsystems that are ITS.  
The fire protection system includes ITS SSCs; it does not include ITWI SSCs or natural or 
engineered barriers.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], 
Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated 
with the Fire Protection System. 
5.6.2.11 HVAC Plant Heating and Cooling System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
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this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the HVAC Plant Heating and Cooling System. 
5.6.2.12 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generating System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467] Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generating 
System. 
5.6.2.13 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management 
System. 
5.6.2.14 Naval Waste Package System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), a Category 2 event sequence that requires the WP to perform prevention or 
mitigation functions could occur (BSC 2005b, Section 5.1.3).  The Seismic Analysis for 
Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has identified potential 
seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  The WP functions 
during the preclosure and postclosure periods result in the WP being identified as ITS and ITWI, 
respectively (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Section 6.3.2.14).  The safety category of this system 
is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A presents the 
nuclear safety design bases associated with the Naval Waste Package System. 
5.6.2.15 Non-Nuclear Handling System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Non-Nuclear Handling System. 
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5.6.2.16 Non-Radiological Waste Management System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Non-Radiological Waste Management 
System. 
5.6.2.17 Plant Services System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Plant Services System. 
5.6.2.18 Radiation/Radiological Monitoring System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Radiation/Radiological Monitoring System. 
5.6.2.19 Remediation System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), a Category 2 event sequence could occur in this system and there are 
features of the system that are ITS for prevention or mitigation of event sequences.  The Seismic 
Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has identified 
potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  This system 
contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that are 
ITWI.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  
Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the 
Remediation System. 
5.6.2.20 Safeguards and Security System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Safeguards and Security System. 
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5.6.2.21 SNF Aging System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), a Category 2 event sequence could occur in this system and there are 
features of the system that are ITS for prevention or mitigation of event sequences.  The Seismic 
Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has identified 
potential seismically initiated failures that could lead to undesired consequences.  This system 
contains SSCs that are ITS and contains SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  
The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  Table A-
II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the SNF Aging 
System. 
5.6.2.22 SNF/HLW Transfer System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7) and Preclosure Consequence Analyses for License Application (BSC 2005c 
[DIRS 174261], Section 7), there are Category 1 and Category 2 event sequences that require 
SSCs in this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  As established by Preclosure 
Consequence Analyses for License Application (BSC 2005c [DIRS 174261], Section 7), the 
worker radiation doses and offsite radiation doses for Category 1 and Category 2 event 
sequences meet the 10 CFR 63.111(b) [DIRS 173273] performance objectives.  This system 
contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not contain SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that are 
ITWI.  The safety category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  
Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the 
SNF/HLW Transfer System. 
5.6.2.23 Subsurface Ventilation System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Subsurface Ventilation System. 
5.6.2.24 Surface Industrial HVAC System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 5.1.2.4) there are Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs 
in this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system includes 
SSCs that are ITS; it does not include ITWI SSCs or natural or engineered barriers.  The safety 
category of this system is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  Table A-II in 
Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated with the Surface Industrial 
HVAC System. 
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5.6.2.25 Surface Nuclear HVAC System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7) and the Preclosure Consequence Analysis for License Application (BSC 
2005c [DIRS 174261]), there are Category 1 event sequences that require SSCs in this system to 
perform prevention or mitigation functions.  The Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 
2004a [DIRS 171470], Attachment III) has identified potential seismically initiated failures that 
could lead to undesired consequences.  This system contains SSCs that are ITS; it does not 
contain SSCs or natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The safety category of this system 
is SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A presents the 
nuclear safety design bases associated with the Surface Nuclear HVAC System. 
5.6.2.26 Waste Package Closure System 
As established by Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2005b [DIRS 
174467], Section 7), there are no Category 1 or Category 2 event sequences that require SSCs in 
this system to perform prevention or mitigation functions.  Therefore, this system consists of no 
SSCs that are ITS.  In addition, there are no natural or engineered barriers that are ITWI.  The 
safety category of this system is Non-SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], Attachment A).  There are 
no nuclear safety design bases associated with the Waste Package Closure System.  
5.7 OTHER ITEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY 
The transportation casks, standardized U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) SNF disposable 
canisters, DOE HLW canisters, DOE multicanister overpacks (MCOs), the naval SNF canisters, 
and the dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) are ITS, but are not a part of the repository architecture 
(Lucas 2004 [DIRS 170073], Attachments 8 and 9).  In the Categorization of Event Sequences 
for License Application analysis (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467], Section 7) it was established that a 
breach of a transportation cask with impact limiters installed is a Beyond Category 2 event 
sequence based on the 10 CFR 71.55 [DIRS 173375] and 10 CFR 71.73 [DIRS 173375] design 
requirements for the transportation casks (BSC 2005b [DIRS 174467], Section 7).  A breach of a 
DOE MCO or a standardized DOE SNF canister is a Beyond Category 2 event sequence based 
on the acceptance requirements of the Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (DOE 
2002 [DIRS 158873], Section 4.3.7).  A breach of the DOE HLW canister, naval SNF canister, 
or DPC as a result of a credible fire is a Beyond Category 2 event sequence (BSC 2005g [DIRS 
174263], Section 7). 
To ensure that transportation casks with impact limiters installed and that standardized DOE 
SNF canisters and MCOs are capable of withstanding drops within the design basis without 
breach, they have been designated as ITS and classified as SC (BSC 2005a [DIRS 174836], 
Attachment A).  Table A-II in Appendix A presents the nuclear safety design bases associated 
with transportation casks, DOE HLW canisters, DOE MCOs, naval SNF canisters, standardized 
DOE SNF canisters, and DPCs.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The 10 CFR 63.2 design bases (nuclear safety design bases) selected in this report using the 
methodology presented in Section 5.1 are listed in Appendix A.  These nuclear safety design 
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bases are used as input to the design of the repository.  These output results are reasonable 
compared to the input and are suitable for their intended use.  As the design of the repository 
proceeds and further event sequences and consequence analyses of hazards are performed, this 
report will be reviewed for impact and revised as necessary. 
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 APPENDIX A 
Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Balance of Plant Facilities 
Administration, 
Security, Utilities, 
Emergency 
Response, Offsite, 
Materials and 
Consumables, Fire 
Protection, 
Maintenance and 
Repair, Construction 
Support, Central 
Control Center, and 
Transportation 
Facilities 
Structure N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these facilities are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Canister Handling Facility  
CHF Structure ITS SC •  The structure shall:  
(1)  be designed for the loads associated with a design basis extreme wind speed.  
(BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.2 and BSC 2005h Section 9) 
(2)  be designed for the loads associated with a design basis tornado wind speed 
with a corresponding pressure drop and rate of pressure drop.  (BSC 2005f 
Section 4.2.2.3.7 and BSC 2005h Section 9) 
(3)  withstand the local effects of Spectrum II tornado missiles, except for the 
entrance and exit vestibules and the steel structures on top of the building.  
(BSC 2005h Sections 6.4.4.1.2 and 9) 
•  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with the 
maximum observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period).  (BSC 
2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
CHF (continued) 
 
Structure (continued) ITS SC •  Facilities that could be damaged by flooding shall be located above the probable 
maximum flood elevation or must be appropriately protected from the probable 
maximum flood.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.2.1 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The structure shall be designed such that storm water runoff from the maximum 
observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period) does not enter the 
structure.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with a volcanic 
ash fall.  (BSC 2005d Section 6.4.53 and BSC 2005f Section 4.2.2.3.4)   
•  The CHF structure shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, it shall be demonstrated that the CHF structure 
has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no structural collapse” safety 
function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Surfaces in the load paths through which WPs, standardized DOE SNF canisters, 
DOE MCOs, naval SNF canisters, DPCs, transportation casks, horizontal transfer 
casks, or site-specific casks are transferred by crane shall be kept free of structures, 
such as post and curbs, that could puncture a container in the event of a drop.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.40)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions shall not jeopardize the structural integrity of 
structures where SNF/HLW is present.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I2) 
•  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that they will not 
result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D1).2 
•  Portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of a non-ITS SSC, which upon failure could 
adversely interact with an ITS SSC and prevent its safety function from being 
performed, shall be classified as ITS or redesigned to eliminate the potential 
unacceptable interaction with the identified ITS SSC.  For seismic interactions, 
portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of an otherwise non-ITS SSC shall be 
classified as ITS and shall be designed to the same seismic DBGM as the ITS SSCs 
subjected to the potential unacceptable interaction, or the non-ITS SSC may be 
redesigned to eliminate the potential unacceptable interaction.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.37) 
•  Facility structures will, where necessary, provide protection of naval SNF canisters 
against breach from vibratory ground motions or from significant mechanical 
arrangement of the canister internals.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.71) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Rails for Trolleys, WP 
Transporters, and 
SRTCs 
ITS SC •  The rails and rail anchorages within the structure shall be designed for loading 
conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, it shall be 
demonstrated that the rails and rail anchorages have sufficient seismic design margin 
to ensure that a “no derailment” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
 
Criticality Prevention 
Features, if required 
(such as curbs, floor 
drains, watertight doors, 
walls, barriers, and 
seals) 
ITS SC •  Flooding of areas of the structure where moderators are controlled shall be 
precluded by passive design features such as drains, flood control channels, curbs, 
elevated processing areas, and walls.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.21)   
CHF (continued) 
 
 
Permanent Shielding 
(including shield doors, 
shield view ports, and 
viewing windows) 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The CHF permanent shielding (including shield doors, shield view ports, and viewing 
windows) shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 seismic 
event to ensure that a “shielding integrity remains intact” safety function3 is maintained.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Closure of airlock doors, shield doors, or other applicable doors on a trolley, SRTC, 
WP transporter, or other conveyance shall not cause a tipover of the conveyance or 
cause the conveyance to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.13)    
•  Radiation exposure to workers due to inadvertent actuation of doors or pit protective 
covers shall be precluded such that this is not a Category 1 event.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.57)    
•  The shield plugs for the canister staging pits shall be designed to preclude impact 
with, and breach of, the canister if the shield plug is dropped.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.6.1)  
Dry Transfer Facility  
DTF Structure  ITS SC • The structure shall:  
(1) be designed for the loads associated with a design basis extreme wind speed.  
(BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.2 and BSC 2005h Section 9) 
(2)  be designed for the loads associated with a design basis tornado wind speed 
with a corresponding pressure drop and rate of pressure drop.  (BSC 2005f 
Section 4.2.2.3.7 and BSC 2005h Section 9) 
(3)  withstand the local effects of Spectrum II tornado missiles, except for the 
entrance and exit vestibules and the steel structures on the DTF roof.  (BSC 
2005h Sections 6.4.4.1.1 and 9) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
DTF (continued) Structure (continued) ITS SC •  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with the 
maximum observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period).  (BSC 
2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  Facilities that could be damaged by flooding shall be located above the probable 
maximum flood elevation or must be appropriately protected from the probable 
maximum flood.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.2.1 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The structure shall be designed such that storm water runoff from the maximum 
observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period) does not enter the 
structure.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with a volcanic 
ash fall.  (BSC 2005d Section 6.4.53 and BSC 2005f Section 4.2.2.3.4) 
•  The DTF structure shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-
2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the DTF structure has 
sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no structural collapse” safety 
function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Surfaces in the load paths through which WPs, standardized DOE SNF canisters, 
DOE MCOs, naval SNF canisters, DPCs, transportation casks, horizontal transfer 
casks, or site-specific casks are transferred by crane shall be kept free of structures, 
such as post and curbs, that could puncture a container in the event of a drop.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.40)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions shall not jeopardize the structural integrity of 
structures where SNF/HLW is present.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I2) 
•  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that they will not 
result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D1).2 
•  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that that they will not 
cause a radioactive release from uncanistered commercial SNF assemblies more 
severe than if no fire had occurred (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D2). 
•  Portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of a non-ITS SSC, which upon failure could 
adversely interact with an ITS SSC and prevent its safety function from being 
performed, shall be classified as ITS or redesigned to eliminate the potential 
unacceptable interaction with the identified ITS SSC.  For seismic interactions, 
portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of an otherwise non-ITS SSC shall be 
classified as ITS and shall be designed to the same seismic DBGM as the ITS SSCs 
subjected to the potential unacceptable interaction, or the non-ITS SSC may be 
redesigned to eliminate the potential unacceptable interaction.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.37) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Structure (continued) ITS SC •  Facility structures will, where necessary, provide protection of naval SNF canisters 
against breach from vibratory ground motions or from significant mechanical 
arrangement of the canister internals.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.71) 
 
Remediation Pool ITS SC •  The remediation pool structure shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the 
remediation pool structure has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no 
failure” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The remediation pool shall be designed such that there are no penetrations through 
that part of the pool structure that is below the minimum water level required for 
radiation shielding and that there is no permanently installed piping that could serve as 
a siphon to lower the water level below the minimum level.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.5.12) 
•  The remediation pool shall be designed with the appropriate impact-absorbing 
capability to prevent loss of pool integrity, given a drop into the pool of a transportation 
cask or site-specific cask having the bounding weight and geometry.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.5.13) 
 
Rails for Trolleys, WP 
Transporters, and 
SRTCs 
ITS SC •  The rails and rail anchorages within the structure shall be designed for loading 
conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, it shall be 
demonstrated that the rails and rail anchorages have sufficient seismic design margin 
to ensure that a “no derailment” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
 
DTF (continued) 
 
Criticality Prevention 
Features, if required 
(such as curbs, floor 
drains, watertight doors, 
walls, barriers, and 
seals) 
ITS SC •  Flooding of areas of the structure where moderators are controlled shall be 
precluded by passive design features such as drains, flood control channels, curbs, 
elevated processing areas, and walls.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.21)   
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
DTF (continued) 
 
Permanent Shielding 
(including shield doors, 
shield view ports, and 
viewing windows) 
ITS SC •  The DTF permanent shielding (including shield doors, shield view ports, and viewing 
windows) shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 seismic 
event to ensure that a “shielding integrity remains intact” safety function3 is maintained.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Closure of airlock doors, shield doors, or other applicable doors on a trolley, SRTC, 
site-specific cask transporter, WP transporter, other conveyance, or transportation cask 
or site-specific cask suspended from an overhead crane shall not cause a tipover of 
the conveyance or cause the conveyance or crane to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.13)    
•  Radiation exposure to workers due to inadvertent actuation of doors shall be 
precluded such that this is not a Category 1 event.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.57)     
 
Fuel Handling Facility  
FHF Structure  ITS SC •  The structure shall:  
(1)  be designed for the loads associated with a design basis extreme wind speed.   
(BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.2 and BSC 2005h Section 9)  
(2)  be designed for the loads associated with a design basis tornado wind speed 
with a corresponding pressure drop and rate of pressure drop.  (BSC 2005f 
Section 4.2.2.3.7 and BSC 2005h Section 9) 
(3)  withstand the local effects of Spectrum II tornado missiles, except for the 
entrance vestibule and the steel structures on the FHF roof.  (BSC 2005h 
Sections 6.5.1, 6.8, and 9) 
•  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with the 
maximum observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period).  (BSC 
2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  Facilities that could be damaged by flooding shall be located above the probable 
maximum flood elevation or must be appropriately protected from the probable 
maximum flood.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.2.1 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The structure shall be designed such that storm water runoff from the maximum 
observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period) does not enter the 
structure.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with a volcanic 
ash fall.  (BSC 2005d Section 6.4.53 and BSC 2005f Section 4.2.2.3.4) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Structure (continued) ITS SC •  The FHF structure shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-
2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the FHF structure has 
sufficient design margin to ensure that a “no structural collapse” safety function3 is 
maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 
2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Surfaces in the load paths through which WPs, standardized DOE SNF canisters, 
naval SNF canisters, DPCs, transportation casks, or site-specific casks are transferred 
by crane shall be kept free of structures, such as post and curbs, that could puncture a 
container in the event of a drop.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.40)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions shall not jeopardize the structural integrity of 
structures where SNF/HLW is present.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I2) 
•  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that they will not 
result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D1).2 
•  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that that they will not 
cause a radioactive release from uncanistered commercial SNF assemblies more 
severe than if no fire had occurred (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D2). 
•  Portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of a non-ITS SSC, which upon failure could 
adversely interact with an ITS SSC and prevent its safety function from being 
performed, shall be classified as ITS or redesigned to eliminate the potential 
unacceptable interaction with the identified ITS SSC.  For seismic interactions, 
portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of an otherwise non-ITS SSC shall be 
classified as ITS and shall be designed to the same seismic DBGM as the ITS SSCs 
subjected to the potential unacceptable interaction, or the non-ITS SSC may be 
redesigned to eliminate the potential unacceptable interaction.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.37) 
•  Facility structures will, where necessary, provide protection of naval SNF canisters 
against breach from vibratory ground motions or from significant mechanical 
arrangement of the canister internals.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.71) 
FHF (continued) 
 
Rails for Trolleys and 
the WP Transporter 
ITS SC •  The rails and rail anchorages within the structure shall be designed for loading 
conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, it shall be 
demonstrated that the rails and rail anchorages have sufficient seismic design margin 
to ensure that a “no derailment” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Criticality Prevention 
Features, if required 
(such as curbs, floor 
drains, watertight doors, 
walls, barriers, and 
seals)  
ITS SC •  Flooding of areas of the structure where moderators are controlled shall be 
precluded by passive design features such as drains, flood control channels, curbs, 
elevated processing areas, and walls.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.21)   
 
FHF (continued) 
 
Permanent Shielding 
(including shield doors, 
shield view ports, and 
viewing windows) 
ITS SC •  Closure of airlock doors, shield doors, or other applicable doors shall not cause or 
result in a tipover or a dropped load from a trolley, a WP transporter, or from other 
conveyance, or drop of a site-specific cask suspended from the vestibule gantry crane.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.13)     
•  The FHF permanent shielding (including shield doors, shield view ports, and viewing 
windows) shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 seismic 
event to ensure that a “shielding integrity remains intact” safety function3 is maintained.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Radiation exposure to workers due to inadvertent actuation of doors shall be 
precluded such that this is not a Category 1 event.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.57)    
 
Subsurface Facility 
Subsurface Facility Rails N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this SSC are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
Emplacement 
 
Nonemplacement 
Openings (North Portal, 
North Ramp, access 
main, and turnouts) 
ITS SC •  The design of the subsurface facility shall ensure that the size and layout of the 
waste emplacement transport routes are consistent with the drift and rockfall modeling, 
including the evaluation of the characteristics of the credible bounding rockfalls.  (BSC 
2005b Section 6.3.6.1.20) 
•  The ramp, portals, shafts, and shaft collar areas shall be protected from water inflow 
as a result of the probable maximum flood.  (BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  Portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of a non-ITS SSC, which upon failure could 
adversely interact with an ITS SSC and prevent its safety function from being 
performed, shall be classified as ITS or redesigned to eliminate the potential 
unacceptable interaction with the identified ITS SSC.  For seismic interactions, 
portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of an otherwise non-ITS SSC shall be 
classified as ITS and shall be designed to the same seismic DBGM as the ITS SSCs 
subjected to the potential unacceptable interaction, or the non-ITS SSC may be 
redesigned to eliminate the potential unacceptable interaction.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.37) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Nonemplacement 
Openings (other than 
North Portal, North 
Ramp, access main, 
and turnouts) 
N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this activity are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
Surface Structures at 
Shafts and Raises 
N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this activity are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
Ground Support for 
Emplacement Drifts and 
Nonemplacement 
Openings 
N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this SSC are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Emplacement Drift  ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  The design of the subsurface facility shall ensure that the size and layout of the 
emplacement drifts are consistent with the drift and rockfall modeling, including the 
evaluation of the characteristics of the credible bounding rockfalls.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 6.3.6.1.20) 
•  Portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of a non-ITS SSC, which upon failure could 
adversely interact with an ITS SSC and prevent its safety function from being 
performed, shall be classified as ITS or redesigned to eliminate the potential 
unacceptable interaction with the identified ITS SSC.  For seismic interactions, 
portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of an otherwise non-ITS SSC shall be 
classified as ITS and shall be designed to the same seismic DBGM as the ITS SSCs 
subjected to the potential unacceptable interaction, or the non-ITS SSC may be 
redesigned to eliminate the potential unacceptable interaction.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.37) 
 
Emplacement Drift 
Invert (Steel) 
N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this SSC are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Emplacement Drift 
Invert (Ballast) 
ITWI SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this SSC are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Emplacement 
(continued) 
 
WP Emplacement 
Pallet 
ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  The WP emplacement pallet shall be designed for loading conditions associated with 
a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to 
ensure that a “no failure” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Drip Shield ITWI SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this SSC are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Emplacement 
(continued) 
Drip Shield 
Emplacement Gantry 
N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this SSC are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Thermal Management N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this activity are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Closure (magma 
bulkheads and backfill 
in access mains, 
exhaust mains, and 
turnouts) 
ITWI SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this activity are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Closure (other than 
magma bulkheads and 
backfill in access mains, 
exhaust mains, and 
turnouts) 
N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this activity are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Postemplacement 
 
Performance 
Confirmation 
N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this activity are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
 
Subsurface 
Development 
Excavation N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the functions associated with this activity are credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event sequence. 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility  
Cask Receipt and 
Return Area 
Structure ITS SC •  The load carrying members of the structure shall:  
(1)  be designed for the loads associated with a design basis extreme wind speed.  
(BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.2 and BSC 2005h Section 9) 
(2)  be designed for the loads associated with a design basis tornado wind speed 
with a corresponding pressure drop and rate of pressure drop.  (BSC 2005f 
Section 4.2.2.3.7 and BSC 2005h Section 9) 
(3)  be designed such that the impact of Spectrum II tornado missiles on any load-
carrying member will not adversely affect the overall integrity of the structural 
steel framing for the important to safety portion of the TCRRF.  (BSC 2005h 
Section 9)   
•  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with the 
maximum observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period).  (BSC 
2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  Facilities that could be damaged by flooding shall be located above the probable 
maximum flood elevation or must be appropriately protected from the probable 
maximum flood.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.2.1 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The structure shall be designed such that storm water runoff from the maximum 
observed hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period) does not enter the 
structure.  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The roof of the structure shall be designed for the loads associated with a volcanic 
ash fall.  (BSC 2005d Section 6.4.53 and BSC 2005f Section 4.2.2.3.4) 
•  The TCRRF load-carrying members shall be designed for loading conditions 
associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate 
that the TCRRF load carrying members have sufficient seismic design margin to 
ensure that a “no structural collapse” safety function3 is maintained for loading 
conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions shall not jeopardize the structural integrity of 
structures where SNF/HLW is present.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I2) 
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 Table A-I.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Facilities 
Facility, System, or 
Subsystem 
 
Component or 
Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Structure (continued) ITS SC •  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that they will not 
result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D1).2 
•  Portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of a non-ITS SSC, which upon failure could 
adversely interact with an ITS SSC and prevent its safety function from being 
performed, shall be classified as ITS or redesigned to eliminate the potential 
unacceptable interaction with the identified ITS SSC.  For seismic interactions, 
portions, parts, subparts, or subsystems of an otherwise non-ITS SSC shall be 
classified as ITS and shall be designed to the same seismic DBGM as the ITS SSCs 
subjected to the potential unacceptable interaction, or the non-ITS SSC may be 
redesigned to eliminate the potential unacceptable interaction.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.37) 
 
Cask Receipt and 
Return Area 
(continued) 
Criticality Prevention 
Features, if required 
(such as curbs, floor 
drains, watertight doors, 
walls, barriers, and 
seals) 
ITS SC •  Flooding of areas of the structure where moderators are controlled shall be 
precluded by passive design features such as drains, flood control channels, curbs, 
elevated processing areas, and walls.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.21)   
 
Transportation Cask 
Buffer Area 
Structure N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are 
credited for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
Warehouse & Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility  
WNNRF 
 
Structure N/A Non-SC Not Applicable.  No function of this facility is credited for the prevention or mitigation of 
an event sequence. 
 
NOTES:  BDBGM = beyond design basis ground motion; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DTF = Dry Transfer 
Facility; FHF = Fuel Handling Facility; ITS = important to safety; SC = safety category; SRTC = site rail transfer cart; SSC = structure, system, or component; 
SSCs = structures, systems, and components; TCRRF = Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility; WNNRF = Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility.
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System 
Cask Preparation  Cask Handling 
Crane (CHF); 
200 ton 
 
ITS SC •  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)    
•  The lift height limits for the casks handled by this crane are provided in Table C-1 in 
Appendix C.  These casks include the following: 
1.  Transportation casks without impact limiters containing naval SNF canisters. 
2.  Transportation casks without impact limiters containing standardized DOE SNF  
canisters. 
3.  Transportation casks without impact limiters containing DOE HLW canisters and 
commercial SNF in vertical DPCs. 
4.  Transportation casks without impact limiters containing a DOE MCO. 
5.  Site-specific casks with vertical DPCs, standardized DOE SNF canisters, or DOE 
HLW canisters.  
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a transportation cask or 
site-specific cask.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Handling 
Crane (CHF); 
200 ton 
(continued) 
 
ITS SC •  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force during transfer to breach a 
cask as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.20)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
Cask Handling 
Crane (DTF); 
200 ton 
ITS SC • The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)     
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)   
•  The lift height limits for the casks handled by this crane are provided in Table C-1 in 
Appendix C; these casks include: 
1.  Transportation casks without impact limiters containing standardized DOE SNF  
canisters, DOE HLW canisters, commercial SNF, or vertical or horizontal DPCs. 
2.  Site-specific casks containing commercial SNF, standardized DOE SNF canisters, 
DOE HLW canisters, or vertical or horizontal DPCs. 
3.  Transportation casks without impact limiters containing a DOE MCO. 
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Handling 
Crane (DTF); 
200 ton 
(continued) 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a transportation cask or 
site-specific cask.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force during transfer to breach a 
cask as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.20)   
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
 
 
Naval Cask 
Handling Crane 
(DTF); 200 ton 
 
ITS SC • The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)      
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)    
•  The lift height limit for transportation casks without impact limiters containing a naval 
SNF canister is provided in Table C-1 in Appendix C. 
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Naval Cask 
Handling Crane 
(DTF); 200 ton 
(continued) 
 
ITS SC •  This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a naval SNF 
transportation cask.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)     
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force during transfer to breach a 
naval SNF transportation cask as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical 
constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.20)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes  
 
ITS SC •  Crane lifting yokes shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no 
drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
 
Turntables (DTF) ITS SC •  Turntables shall be designed for stability and prevention of a tipover of any waste 
container on the table for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In 
addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the turntable has sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no tipover” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Docking 
Ring (DTF, FHF) 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
Cask Pit, 
Pedestal; 
(CHF) 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
Cask Shielded Pit 
Cover (CHF) 
ITS SC •  The cask pit protective cover shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-1 seismic event to ensure that a “shielding integrity remains intact” safety function3 
is maintained.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The cask pit protective cover shall be sturdy enough to prevent a WP or site-specific 
cask that is dropped on the pit cover from penetrating the pit cover and falling into the pit.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.6.6)     
•  Radiation exposure to workers due to inadvertent actuation of the pit protective covers 
shall be precluded such that this is not a Category 1 event.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.57)   
 
Pit Crush Pad 
(CHF) 
ITS SC •  Crush pads shall limit the impact energy of a dropped canister, cask, or WP to be less 
than or equal to the impact energy associated with a drop of a canister, cask, or WP onto 
an unyielding surface from their maximum specified drop height for the canister, cask, or 
WP6.  (BSC 2005b Sections 5.1.1.18 and 5.1.1.52) 
 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
 
Entrance 
Vestibule Crane  
(FHF); 200 ton 
ITS SC • The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)      
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)     
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
 
Entrance 
Vestibule Crane 
(FHF); 200 ton 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  The lift height limits for the casks handled by this crane are provided in Table C-1 in 
Appendix C; these casks include: 
1.  Transportation cask without impact limiters containing naval SNF canisters. 
2.  Transportation cask without impact limiters containing standardized DOE SNF 
canisters or DOE HLW canisters. 
3.  Transportation cask without impact limiters or site-specific cask containing 
commercial SNF or DPCs. 
4.  Site-specific casks containing vertical DPCs, standardized DOE SNF canisters, or 
DOE HLW canisters. 
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a transportation cask or 
site-specific cask.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)     
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force during transfer to breach a 
cask, WP, or site-specific cask as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical 
constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.20)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
  
N
uclear Safety D
esign B
ases for License A
pplication  
 
 
  
000-30R
-M
G
R
0-00400-000-003 
A
-19 
Septem
ber 2005 
Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
 
Main Transfer 
Room Crane 
(FHF); 200 ton 
 
ITS SC •  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)     
•  The probability of dropping handling equipment from a crane onto a canister shall be 
less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 for each canister transferred.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.11)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)    
•  The lift height limits for the transportation casks, canisters, and WPs handled by this 
crane are provided in Table C-1 in Appendix C; these casks, canisters, and WPs include: 
1.  Transportation casks without impact limiters, including casks containing naval 
SNF canisters, DOE HLW canisters, standardized DOE SNF canisters, vertical 
DPCs, or commercial SNF. 
2.  Site-specific casks containing commercial SNF, standardized DOE SNF canisters, 
DOE HLW canisters, or vertical DPCs. 
3.  Naval SNF canisters. 
4.  DOE HLW canisters, standardized DOE SNF canisters, and vertical DPCs. 
5.  Unsealed, loaded WPs. 
6.  Sealed WPs. 
7.  Sealed WPs in a horizontal orientation on an emplacement pallet. 
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a loaded sealed site-
specific cask, a loaded sealed WP, a DOE HLW canister, a standardized DOE SNF 
canister, a naval SNF canister, or a DPC.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Main Transfer 
Room Crane 
(FHF); 200 ton 
(continued) 
 
ITS SC •  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force to breach a cask, WP, 
canister, or site-specific cask during transfer as the result of attempts to overcome 
mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.20)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Mobile Elevating 
Platform 
 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
 
Cask Pit Movable 
Platform (CHF) 
 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Preparation 
(continued) 
Cask Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices (DTF, 
FHF) 
ITS SC •  Upon a loss of power, this trolley shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this trolley shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2)    
•  The trolley system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event to maintain trolley stability and prevent waste container slapdown.  In 
addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the trolley system has sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no slapdown” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Pedestals and hold-down devices shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to 
ensure that a “no tipover” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated 
with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The trolley shall be designed with an inherent speed limit such that a collision at the 
trolley speed limit would not cause the trolley to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.61)    
•  Loaded transfer trolleys shall not derail or drop their loads.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.36)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices (DTF, 
CHF, FHF) 
ITS SC •  Upon a loss of power, this trolley shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this trolley shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2)    
•  WP trolleys shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic 
event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no tipover” 
safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic 
event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Pedestals and hold-down devices shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to 
ensure that a “no slapdown” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The trolley shall be designed with an inherent speed limit such that a collision at the 
trolley speed limit would not cause the trolley to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.61)     
•  Loaded transfer trolleys shall not derail or drop their loads.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.36)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
WP Preparation  
WP Docking Ring 
(DTF, FHF) 
 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Preparation 
(continued) 
WP and Canister 
Handling Crane 
(CHF); 100 ton 
 
ITS SC •  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)     
•  The probability of dropping handling equipment from a crane onto a canister shall be 
less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 for each canister transferred.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.11)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)    
•  The lift height limits for the canisters and WPs handled by this crane are provided in 
Table C-1 in Appendix C; these canisters and WPs include: 
1.  Naval SNF canisters, standardized DOE SNF canisters, DOE MCOs, or DOE 
HLW canisters.   
2.  Vertical DPCs. 
3.  Unsealed WPs containing standardized DOE SNF canisters, DOE HLW canisters, 
naval SNF canisters, or DOE MCOs.   
4.  Sealed WPs containing standardized DOE SNF canisters, DOE HLW canisters, 
naval SNF canisters, or DOE MCOs.   
5.  Sealed WPs in a horizontal orientation on an emplacement pallet.    
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a loaded sealed WP, a 
standardized DOE SNF canister, a DOE HLW canister, a naval SNF canister, a DOE 
MCO, a loaded sealed site-specific cask, or a DPC.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)     
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP and Canister 
Handling Crane 
(CHF); 100 ton 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force during transfer to breach a 
canister or WP as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.20)    
 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes  
ITS SC •  Crane lifting yokes shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic margin to ensure that a “no drop” 
safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic 
event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
 
WP/Site-Specific 
Cask Pit 
Protective Covers 
(CHF) 
ITS SC •  The WP/MSC pit protective covers shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-1 seismic event to ensure that a “no failure” safety function3 is maintained.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Pit covers shall be sturdy enough to prevent a WP or site-specific cask that is dropped 
on the pit cover from penetrating the pit cover and falling into the pit.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.6.6)     
•  Radiation exposure to workers due to inadvertent actuation of the pit protective covers 
shall be precluded such that this is not a Category 1 event.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.57)   
 
WP/Site-Specific 
Cask Pit 
Pedestals (CHF) 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
WP Preparation 
(continued) 
 
Crush Pad ITS SC •  Crush pads shall limit the impact energy of a dropped unsealed WP to be less than or 
equal to the impact energy associated with a drop of an unsealed WP onto an unyielding 
surface from the maximum specified drop height for the unsealed WP.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.52)    
 
Cask Restoration  Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Receipt and Return System 
SRTC ITS SC •  In the instances when the SRTC moves a cask without impact limiters (typically only 
within structures), the SRTC shall prevent slapdown of the cask for loading conditions 
associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that 
the SRTC transporting a cask without impact limiters has sufficient seismic design margin 
to ensure that a “no slapdown” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  A speed limit for which SRTCs will be pulled/pushed by the SRTC tractor shall be 
established such that a collision with shield or airlock doors or other heavy objects does 
not overturn the SRTC or cause it to lose its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.38)    
•  In the instances where the SRTC moves a cask without impact limiters (typically only 
within structures) an SRTC carrying a transportation cask or a site-specific cask shall not 
derail and the transportation cask or site-specific cask shall not fall from the SRTC under 
normal operating conditions or as the result of a collision.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.35)    
 
SRTC Rails  N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
SRTC Positioner N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
SRTC Positioner 
Turntable 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
SRTC Turntables N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
SRTC Buffer 
SRTC Tractor N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Receipt and 
Return  
Cask Handling 
Crane (TCRRF); 
250 ton 
ITS SC 
 
•  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)     
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)    
•  The lift height limits for the transportation casks handled by this crane are provided in 
Table C-1 in Appendix C; these casks include: 
1.  Transportation casks and transfer casks without impact limiters.    
2.  Transportation casks with impact limiters.    
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a transportation cask.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force to breach a cask during 
transfer as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.20)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  The crane for lifting transportation casks with impact limiters shall not be capable of 
lifting a cask more than 30 ft above the floor.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.9.1)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes  
ITS SC •  The crane lifting yokes shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic margin to ensure that a “no 
drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
 
Cask Receipt and 
Return (continued) 
Crush Pad ITS SC •  Crush pads shall limit the impact energy of a dropped cask to be less than or equal to 
the impact energy associated with a drop of a cask onto an unyielding surface from the 
maximum specified drop height for the cask.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.18)    
 
Communications System 
Communications 
 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Digital Control and Management Information System 
Digital Control and 
Management 
Information 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
DOE and Commercial WP System 
DOE and 
Commercial WP  
 
 
 
Waste Package ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  Sealed WPs shall withstand without breaching the following drops:  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.3.12) 
A.  Free-drop of 6.5 ft from a vertical orientation onto a horizontal surface (trunnion 
collars installed) 
B.  Free-drop of 7.8 ft from a horizontal orientation onto a horizontal surface (trunnion 
collars installed) 
C.  Free-drop with the emplacement pallet from a horizontal orientation onto a horizontal 
surface (trunnion collars not installed) of 6.5 ft from the bottom of the emplacement 
pallet 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
DOE and 
Commercial WP 
(continued) 
 
 
 
Waste Package 
(continued) 
ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  Sealed WPs shall withstand without breaching the following drops (continued):  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.3.12) 
D.  Tip-over onto a horizontal surface from a 6.5 ft elevated surface (trunnion collars 
installed) 
E.  Tip-over onto the tilting machine, including contact with the trunnion cradles or the 
floor (trunnion collars installed). 
Note:  Drop and tip-over event sequences shall be evaluated for worst possible (most 
damaging) credible conditions including initial geometric position and weight of 
contents.  An unyielding, flat horizontal surface may be used to bound the 
consequences of a drop.  Drops shall include attendant swing-down and/or slap-
down from the indicated position, with or without trunnion collars attached, as 
appropriate. 
•  WPs, in a horizontal orientation on an emplacement pallet, shall be lifted in accordance 
with the lift height limits in Table C-1 in Appendix C. 
•  WPs in a vertical orientation shall be lifted in accordance with the lift height limits in 
Table C-1 in Appendix C. 
•  WPs shall withstand a single rockfall of 1.2 × 105 joules or less without breaching.  (BSC 
2005b Section 6.3.6.1.20) 
•  WPs shall withstand two consecutive rockfalls having a total kinetic energy of 1.0 × 105 
joules or less without breaching.  (BSC 2005b Section 6.3.6.1.20) 
•  WPs shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event 
and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that “no breach” and “no 
criticality” safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The size of the berth in a WP shall be restricted such that a DOE MCO cannot be tilted 
more than an angle of 3 degrees from vertical upon impact with the floor of the berth.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.15) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Waste Package 
(continued) 
ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  Sealed WPs shall be designed such that drops, collisions, and other handling impacts 
within the WP design bases (allowing for rearrangement of container internals, proximity of 
other sealed WPs, and without credit for burnup) cannot lead to a nuclear criticality.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.3.1)    
•  WPs shall be designed, with credit for moderator control and without credit for burnup, 
such that:  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.3.2)    
A.  WPs configured for commercial SNF can be loaded with any combination of 
commercial SNF assemblies that are acceptable for disposal without leading 
to a preclosure nuclear criticality. 
B.  DOE codisposal WPs can be loaded with any combination of DOE canisters 
(including standardized DOE SNF canisters, MCOs, and DOE HLW canisters) 
that fit in the basket positions without leading to a preclosure nuclear criticality. 
The demonstration of criticality safety must account for credible 
rearrangements of fissile material that may occur during normal operations or 
due to a Category 1 or Category 2 event sequence involving a drop or other 
impact. 
•  An unsealed WP that is dropped from within 2 ft above an essentially unyielding flat 
surface shall not spill its contents.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.3.11) 
 
DOE and 
Commercial WP 
(continued) 
 
 
 
Trunnion Collar ITS SC •  Trunnion collars shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure a “no drop” 
safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic 
event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
DOE SNF Disposable Canister 
DOE SNF 
Disposable 
Canister  
 
Standardized 
DOE SNF 
Canister  
ITS SC •  The probability that a standardized DOE SNF canister is defective such that it may 
breach if dropped in any orientation from a height of 23 ft onto an essentially unyielding flat 
surface shall be 2.3 × 10-4 or less.  (BSC 2005b Section 4.1.18)  
•  A standardized DOE SNF canister in a cask, WP, staging rack, or staging pit, shall 
withstand without breach a drop of a DOE HLW canister onto it from 2 ft above the floor of 
the transfer cell and from 23 ft above the floor of the cask, WP, staging rack, or staging pit.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.25)    
•  A standardized DOE SNF canister shall not breach if dropped onto a structural corner, 
such as the edge of a cask, WP, pit, or load-port, or onto a cask basket or WP internal 
baffle, from the most limiting height, as follows (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.29): 
A.  23 ft above the floor of the cask, WP, staging rack, or staging pit. 
B.  2 ft above the floor of the transfer cell. 
•  A standardized DOE SNF canister shall not breach if lifted in accordance with the lift 
height limits in Table C-1 in Appendix C. 
•  A standardized DOE SNF canister shall capable of meeting loading conditions 
associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic margin to 
ensure that “no breach” and “no criticality” safety functions3 are maintained for loading 
conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  A standardized DOE SNF canister shall withstand without breach a drop of another 
standardized DOE SNF canister on top of it from 23 ft above the floor of a cask, WP, 
staging rack or staging pit and from 2 ft above the floor of the transfer cell.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.28)   
•  A drop of a standardized DOE SNF canister shall not lead to a nuclear criticality.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.3)   
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
DOE MCO  ITS SC •  The probability that a DOE MCO is defective such that it may breach if dropped from 
less than a height of 23 ft in less than a 3-degree vertical orientation or 2 ft from any 
orientation shall be 2.3 × 10-4 or less.  (BSC 2005b Section 4.1.18)  
• A DOE MCO in a cask or WP shall withstand without breach a drop of a DOE HLW 
canister onto it from 2 ft above the floor of the transfer cell and from 23 ft above the floor of 
the cask or WP.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.25)    
•  A DOE MCO shall withstand without breach a drop of another DOE MCO onto it from 2 ft 
above the floor of the transfer cell and from 23 ft above the floor of the cask or WP.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.28)    
•  A DOE MCO shall not breach if dropped onto a structural corner, such as the edge of a 
cask, WP, pit, or load-port, or onto a cask basket or WP internal baffle, from the most 
limiting height, as follows (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.29): 
A.  23 ft above the floor of the cask or WP. 
B.  2 ft above the floor of the transfer cell. 
•  A DOE MCO shall not breach if dropped in accordance with the lift height limits in Table 
C-1 in Appendix C. 
•  A DOE MCO shall be capable of meeting loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that “no 
breach” and “no criticality” safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  A drop of a DOE MCO shall not lead to a nuclear criticality.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.3)   
DOE HLW 
Canister 
ITS SC •  A DOE HLW canister shall be capable of meeting loading conditions associated with a  
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to a “no 
breach” safety function3.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1, BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.8) 
Internal Geometry 
Control 
ITS SC •  The DOE SNF disposable canister internal geometry control shall be capable of meeting 
loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient 
seismic design margin to ensure that a “no criticality” safety function3 is maintained for 
loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
DOE SNF 
Disposable 
Canister 
(continued) 
 
 
Internal Neutron 
Absorbers  
ITWI SC •  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of a preclosure event 
sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Dual-Purpose Canister 
DPC Entire ITS SC •  DPCs shall be designed to ensure nuclear criticality safety with optimum moderation and 
the most reactive waste forms.  Criticality safety will be maintained despite any geometric 
rearrangements due to a drop or other handling incident.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.4)   
 
Electrical Power System 
Switchyard and 
Standby Power 
Line End 
Transmission 
Tower; Line Side 
High Voltage 
Disconnect 
Switch; High 
Voltage Breaker, 
Load Side High 
Voltage 
Disconnect 
Switch; Main 
Transformer; and 
Non-segregated 
Phase Bus to 
12.47 kV Main 
Switchgear  
ITS SC •  Electrical power system components shall provide reliable power to the DTF and FHF 
Surface Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement Subsystem to meet the performance criteria 
in accordance with the Surface Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement Subsystem nuclear 
safety design bases.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.48, BSC 2004c Table 9) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Switchyard and 
Standby Power 
(continued) 
Standby Diesel 
Generators and 
SSCs other than 
Line End 
Transmission 
Tower; Line Side 
High Voltage 
Disconnect 
Switch; High 
Voltage Breaker; 
Load Side High 
Voltage 
Disconnect 
Switch; Main 
Transformer; and 
Nonsegregated 
Phase Bus to 
12.47kV Main 
Switchgear 
 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Normal Power 12.47kV Main 
Switchgear; 
12.47kV to 4.16kV 
Distribution 
Transformer to 
Emergency 
Switchgear Bus A; 
12.47kV to 4.16kV 
Distribution 
Transformer to 
Emergency 
Switchgear Bus B  
 
ITS SC •  Electrical power system components shall provide reliable power to the DTF and FHF 
Surface Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement Subsystem to meet the performance criteria 
in accordance with the Surface Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement Subsystem nuclear 
safety design bases.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.48; BSC 2004c Table 9)     
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Normal Power 
(continued) 
Normal Power 
Subsystem SSCs 
other than 
12.47kV Main 
Switchgear; 
12.47kV to 4.16kV 
Distribution 
Transformer 
to Emergency 
Switchgear Bus A; 
12.47kV to 4.16kV 
Distribution 
Transformer to 
Emergency 
Switchgear Bus B 
(includes 4.16kV 
Switchgear Buses 
A, B, C, D, E, F, 
G, H, J, K, L, M, 
N, and P; 12.47kV 
Switchgear C 
and D [located at 
South Service 
Portal]) 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
  
N
uclear Safety D
esign B
ases for License A
pplication  
 
 
  
000-30R
-M
G
R
0-00400-000-003 
A
-35 
Septem
ber 2005 
Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Emergency Power 
 
4.16kV 
Emergency 
Switchgear Bus A 
and B; Emergency 
Load Center 
Transformers for 
DTF 1, DTF 2, 
and FHF; 
Emergency Load 
Centers and Motor 
Control Centers 
located in DTF 1, 
DTF 2, and FHF; 
and Feeders Up 
To and Including 
the ITS Loads  
 
ITS SC •  Electrical power system components shall provide reliable power to the DTF and FHF 
Surface Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement Subsystem to meet the performance criteria 
in accordance with the Surface Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement Subsystem nuclear 
safety design bases.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.48, BSC 2004c Table 9)     
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Emergency Power 
(continued) 
Emergency Diesel 
Generators A  
and B and SSCs 
other than 4.16kV 
Emergency 
Switchgear Buses 
A and B; 
Emergency Load 
Center 
Transformers for 
DTF 1, DTF 2, 
and FHF; 
Emergency Load 
Centers and 
MCCs located in 
DTF 1, DTF 2, 
and FHF; and 
Feeders Up To 
and Including the 
ITS Loads 
 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Electrical Support System 
Lighting Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Grounding Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Lightning 
Protection 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Cathodic Protection Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Heat Tracing Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Cable Raceway 
 
The portion of 
cable raceway 
subsystem that 
supports the 
equipment and 
components in the 
Electrical Power 
System that are 
classified as ITS 
(including portions 
of the switchyard, 
12.47 kV main 
switchgear A and 
B, 4.16 kV 
emergency bus A 
and B, 480 V 
emergency load 
centers and motor 
control centers, 
125 V DC and 120 
V AC UPS) 
ITS SC •  The portion of the cable raceway subsystem that supports ITS functions of the 
emergency power subsystem shall provide reliable power to the DTF and FHF Surface 
Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement System to meet the performance criteria in 
accordance with the Surface Nuclear HVAC Primary Confinement System nuclear safety 
design bases.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.48)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cable Raceway 
(continued) 
 
The portion of the 
cable raceway 
subsystem that 
supports Non-SC 
functions of the 
Electrical Power 
System (including 
portions of the 
normal power 
subsystem, 
switchgear and 
standby power 
subsystem, and 
emergency power 
subsystem 
[including 
emergency diesel 
generators]) 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Emplacement and Retrieval System 
WP Transportation  
 
WP Transporter 
 
ITS SC 
 
•  The WP transporter shall transport the WP in a manner such that if a collision or 
derailment (excluding tipover) occurs, the WP impact energy will be low enough to 
preclude a WP breach; this impact energy translates into a maximum WP transporter 
speed of 15 mph.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.7.3)    
•  The WP transporter shall transport the WP in a manner such that if a collision or 
derailment leading to a WP transporter tipover occurs, the WP impact energy will be low 
enough to preclude a WP breach.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.7.7) 
•  While on the surface, the WP transporter shall be designed to function in extreme 
straight wind (90 mph).  (BSC 2005b Section 4.1.13) 
•  The WP transporter or its bedplate shall not collide with a WP on the WP turntable and 
cause a WP breach.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.39)    
•  The rate of a WP transporter runaway shall be less than 8.3 × 10-9 runaways per WP 
trip.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.7.8) 
•  The WP transporter (together with the locomotive and coupler) shall be designed to 
prevent runaway of the WP transporter for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the WP transporter (together 
with the locomotive and coupler) has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no 
runaway” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The WP transporter shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall 
be controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that they will not 
result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D1).2 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Transportation 
(continued) 
 
WP Transporter 
(continued) 
 
ITS SC 
 
•  The WP transporter shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 
seismic event to ensure that a “shielding integrity remains intact” safety function3 is 
maintained.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The transporter shielded compartment shall withstand any fall of failed ground support 
materials, as well as a set of rockfalls having a total mass of 5.4 MT, without jeopardizing 
the structural integrity of the WP.  (BSC 2005b Section 6.3.6.1.9) 
•  Movement of the WP transporter shielded enclosure doors shall not breach the WP or 
cause it to fall from the bedplate of the transporter.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.7.2)    
•  The restraints used to immobilize the bedplate inside the shielded compartment of the 
WP transporter and the mechanism for locking the doors of the shielded compartment shall 
withstand a collision or derailment (including tipover) of the transporter without resulting in 
a Category 1 or Category 2 event sequence.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.7.4)    
•  Spurious or operator-induced opening of the WP shielded compartment followed by a 
bedplate roll-out shall be precluded when the transporter is in motion.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.7.6)    
•  Radiation exposure to workers due to inadvertent actuation of the WP transporter 
shielded compartment doors shall be precluded such that this is not a Category 1 event.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.57)    
•  Upon a loss of power, the WP transporter shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and 
enter a locked mode; upon a restoration of power, the WP transporter shall stay in the 
locked mode until operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Emplacement  
 
WP Emplacement 
Gantry 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The emplacement gantry shall have a drop rate of less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 
drops/transfer regardless of the cause, including equipment failures, human error, or some 
combination of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.8.1)    
•  The lift height limit for WPs in a horizontal orientation on the emplacement pallet is 
provided in Table C-1 in Appendix C.     
•  The WP emplacement gantry, carrying a WP, shall not be capable of running off the end 
of the emplacement drift or transfer dock rails.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.8.3)     
•  If the WP emplacement gantry were to fall on the WP transporter and impact the WP, it 
shall not cause the WP to be breached.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.8.6)    
• The WP emplacement gantry shall be limited to a maximum speed of 15 mph such that a 
collision at this speed limit shall not result in a WP breach.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.8.7)    
•  Upon a loss of power, the WP emplacement gantry shall be designed to stop, retain its 
load, and enter a locked mode; upon a restoration of power, the WP emplacement gantry 
shall stay in the locked mode until operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2) 
•  The conditional probability of the WP emplacement gantry having exceeded the lift 
height limit given that a drop occurred shall be 10-4 or less.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.8.10)   
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  The WP emplacement gantry shall be designed such that severity of credible 
fires/explosions shall be controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such 
that they will not result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item 
D1).2 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Retrieval  Components of 
this system are 
the same as those 
in the WP 
Transportation 
subsystem and 
WP Emplacement 
subsystem 
ITS SC The nuclear safety design bases for this system are the same as those in the WP 
Transportation and WP Emplacement Subsystems since they share the same 
components. 
Transport 
Locomotive  
ITS SC •  The transport locomotive (together with the WP transporter and coupler) shall be 
designed to prevent the runaway of the WP transporter for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the transport 
locomotive (together with the WP transporter and coupler) has sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no runaway” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Support Equipment  
 
Gantry Carrier N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
Environmental/Meteorological Monitoring System 
Environmental/ 
Meteorological 
Monitoring  
 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Fire Protection System 
Explosion 
Protection 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None if the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence.  
Fire Alarm Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None if the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence.  
Fire Barriers Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None if the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence.  
Fire Detection Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None if the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence.  
Manual Isolation 
Valves Leading to 
the Double-
Interlock Preaction 
Sprinklers in 
Moderator Control 
Areas  
ITS SC Once closed by operator action, the manual isolation valves leading to the double-interlock 
preaction sprinklers in moderator control areas shall be capable of preventing the 
introduction of water to the sprinklers when fissile material is present.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.66) 
Fire Suppression 
 
SSCs other than 
Manual Isolation 
Valves Leading to 
the Double-
Interlock Preaction 
Sprinklers in 
Moderator Control 
Areas 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None if the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence.  
Fire Water Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with this subsystem are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
HVAC Plant Heating and Cooling System 
HVAC Plant 
Heating and 
Cooling 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management System 
Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste 
Management 
 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generating System 
Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste 
Generating 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Naval Spent Fuel Canister 
Naval SFC 
Internals 
Naval SFC 
Baskets, Naval 
SNF Basket 
Spacers, 
Corrosion-
Resistant Cans; 
Control Rods or 
installed Hafnium 
Neutron-
Absorbing 
Assemblies and 
their Neutron 
Poison Retention 
Devices; and 
Naval SNF 
Cladding 
ITWI SC This SSC is ITWI; no function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
 
Naval SFC Naval SFC ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  The naval SFC shall withstand fire conditions corresponding to a black body gas 
exposure flux of 50 kW/m2 and a temperature of 1000°C (1832°F) for 2 minutes (BSC 
2005g [DIRS 174263], Section 6.2.1.2.6). 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Naval Waste Package System 
Naval WP Waste Package ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  Sealed naval WPs shall withstand without breaching the following drops:  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.3.12) 
A.  Free-drop of 6.5 ft (3.3 ft for the naval long WP) from a vertical orientation onto a 
horizontal surface (trunnion collars installed) 
B.  Free-drop of 7.8 ft from a horizontal orientation onto a horizontal surface (trunnion 
collars installed) 
C.  Free-drop with the emplacement pallet from a horizontal orientation onto a horizontal 
surface (trunnion collars not installed) of 6.5 ft from the bottom of the emplacement 
pallet 
D.  Tip-over onto a horizontal surface from a 6.5 ft (1.6 ft for the naval long WP) elevated 
surface (trunnion collars installed) 
E.  Tip-over onto the tilting machine, including contact with the trunnion cradles or the 
floor (trunnion collars installed). 
Note:  Drop and tip-over event sequences shall be evaluated for worst possible (most 
damaging) credible conditions including initial geometric position and weight of 
contents.  An unyielding, flat horizontal surface may be used to bound the 
consequences of a drop.  Drops shall include attendant swing-down and/or slap-
down from the indicated position, with or without trunnion collars attached, as 
appropriate. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Waste Package 
(continued) 
ITS 
ITWI 
SC •  A naval WP in a horizontal orientation on the emplacement pallet shall be lifted in 
accordance with the lift height limits in Table C-1 in Appendix C. 
•  A naval long WP in a vertical orientation shall be lifted in accordance with the lift height 
limits in Table C-1 in Appendix C.   
•  Naval WPs shall withstand a single rockfall of 1.2 × 105 joules or less without breaching.  
(BSC 2005b Section 6.3.6.1.20) 
•  Naval WPs shall withstand two consecutive rockfalls having a total kinetic energy of 
1.0 × 105 joules or less without breaching.  (BSC 2005b Section 6.3.6.1.20) 
•  Naval WPs shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic 
event and to demonstrate sufficient margin to ensure that “no breach” and “no criticality” 
safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic 
event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Sealed naval WPs shall be designed such that drops, collisions, and other handling 
impacts within the WP design bases (allowing for rearrangement of container internals, 
proximity of other sealed WPs, and without credit for burnup) cannot lead to a nuclear 
criticality.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.3.1)    
•  The naval WP shall be designed such that it can be loaded with a naval SFC without 
leading to a preclosure nuclear criticality with credit for moderator control.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.3.2)     
•  An unsealed naval WP that is dropped from within 2 ft above an essentially unyielding 
flat surface shall not spill its contents.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.3.11)    
•  An unsealed naval WP containing a naval SFC shall be lifted in accordance with the lift 
height limits in Table C-1 in Appendix C.    
 
Naval WP 
(continued) 
 
Trunnion Collar ITS SC •  Trunnion collars shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no 
drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Non-Nuclear Handling System 
Non-Nuclear 
Handling 
 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited for 
the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Non-Radiological Waste Management System 
Non-Radiological 
Waste 
Management 
 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Plant Services System 
Plant Services Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Radiation/Radiological Monitoring System 
Radiation/ 
Radiological 
Monitoring  
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Remediation System 
Dry Remediation 
 
Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices  
ITS SC •  Upon a loss of power, this trolley shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this trolley shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  Pedestals and hold-down devices shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to 
ensure that a “no tipover” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated 
with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The trolley system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event to maintain trolley stability and prevent waste container slapdown.  In 
addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the trolley system has sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no slapdown” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The trolley shall be designed with an inherent speed limit such that a collision at the 
trolley speed limit would not cause the trolley to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.61)     
•  Loaded transfer trolleys shall not derail or drop their loads.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.36)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Dry Remediation 
(continued) 
 
Turntable ITS SC •  The turntable system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event to maintain turntable stability and prevent waste container tipover.  In 
addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the turntable system has sufficient seismic 
design margin to ensure that a “no tipover” safety function3 is maintained for loading 
conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Turntable 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Fuel Container ITS SC •  The fuel container shall be designed to ensure nuclear criticality safety with optimum 
moderation and the most reactive waste forms.  Criticality safety will be maintained despite 
geometric rearrangements due to a drop or other handling incidents.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.4)    
 
Dry Remediation 
(continued) 
 
Docking Station 
 
 
ITS SC 
 
 
•  A drop or collision involving components associated with a docking port shall not breach 
the lid of a transportation cask or site-specific cask situated at the docking port.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.17)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Handling 
Crane; 
200 ton 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)      
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)     
•  The lift height limit for transportation casks without impact limiters or site-specific  
casks is provided in Table C-1 of Appendix C.   
•  This crane and its rigging shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a transportation cask or 
site-specific cask.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
 
Wet Remediation 
 
Cask Handling 
Crane; 
200 ton 
(continued) 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force during transfer to breach a 
cask as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.20)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Pit Crush Pad ITS SC •  Crush pads shall limit the impact energy of a dropped canister, cask, or WP to be less 
than or equal to the impact energy associated with a drop of a cask or WP onto an 
unyielding surface from their maximum specified drop height for the cask or WP6.  (BSC 
2005b Sections 5.1.1.18, 5.1.3.9, and 5.1.1.52)    
 
Pool Crush Pad ITS SC •  Crush pads shall limit the impact energy of a dropped cask to be less than or equal to 
the impact energy associated with a drop of a cask onto an unyielding surface from their 
maximum specified drop height for the cask 6.  (BSC 2005b Sections 5.1.1.18) 
Turntable N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  No function of this SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of an 
event sequence. 
Wet Remediation 
(continued) 
 
Fuel Handling 
Machine and 
Grapples 
ITS SC •  The fuel handling machine and grapples shall be designed for loading conditions 
associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event and demonstrate sufficient seismic design 
margin to a “maintain waste form” safety function3.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1, BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.2.10) 
•  The fuel handling machine and grapples shall be designed for loading conditions 
associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no fall down” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The fuel handling machine shall have a drop rate of less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 
drops/transfer, including transfers in single-assembly canisters.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.7)   
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Wet Remediation 
(continued) 
 
Fuel Handling 
Machine and 
Grapples 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  The rate of assembly collisions during an assembly transfer operation shall be less than 
or equal to 1 × 10-5 collisions/transfer.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.8)   
•  The probability of a drop of handling equipment onto a commercial SNF assembly with 
enough energy to breach the assembly shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-7 
impacts/transfer for each assembly transferred.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.9)    
•  The fuel handling machine shall not be capable of lateral movements of handling 
equipment at a speed that could breach a commercial SNF assembly as a result of the 
collision of handling equipment against  an SNF assembly.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.54)   
•  Upon a loss of power, the fuel handling machine shall be designed to stop, retain its 
load, and enter a locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this machine shall stay in the 
locked mode until operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  Commercial SNF assemblies shall be lifted less than 28 ft above an essentially 
unyielding surface.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.46) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes  
ITS SC • The crane lifting yokes shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-
2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the crane lifting yokes 
have sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety function3 is 
maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a 
Table IV-1) 
Wet Remediation 
(continued) 
Staging 
Racks/Baskets in 
Remediation Pool 
ITS SC •  The staging racks shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event for stability and distortion such as to maintain assembly geometry in the 
rack.  In addition, analyses shall demonstrate that the staging racks/baskets have sufficient 
seismic design margin to ensure that distortion of the racks/baskets is limited and stability 
is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a 
Table IV-1) 
•  Fully loaded baskets in staging racks shall be subcritical when fully flooded with pure 
water (i.e., no credit for neutron absorbers dissolved in the water); the baskets shall have 
sufficient criticality controls to remain subcritical under the expected range of conditions 
resulting from handling incidents in and out of staging racks; and the baskets shall be 
closed during handling such that a closed basket being transferred in the pool will not spill 
SNF assemblies into the pool if the basket is dropped.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.5.9)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Remediation 
 
WP Remediation 
Crane; 100 ton 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)    
•  The probability of dropping handling equipment from a crane onto a canister shall be 
less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 for each canister transferred.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.11)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1) 
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12) 
•  The lift height limits for the WPs, SNF assemblies, and canisters handled by this crane 
are provided in Table C-1 in Appendix C; these WPs, SNF assemblies, and canisters 
include: 
1.  Sealed WPs containing commercial SNF, standardized DOE canisters, DOE HLW 
canisters, naval SNF canisters, or DOE MCOs.  
2.  Unsealed, loaded WPs containing commercial SNF, standardized DOE canisters, 
DOE HLW canisters, naval SNF canisters, or DOE MCOs.  
3.  Standardized DOE SNF canisters, DOE HLW canisters, DOE MCOs, sealed 
vertical DPCs, or unsealed vertical DPCs.   
4.  Commercial SNF assemblies. 
•  This crane system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and maintain its load.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that this 
crane system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety 
function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Remediation 
Crane;100 ton 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a loaded sealed WP, a 
DOE MCO, a standardized DOE SNF canister, a DOE HLW canister, or a DPC.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.19)     
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force to breach a WP or a canister 
as the result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.20)    
•  This crane, which can be used to transfer SNF assemblies, shall not be capable of 
lateral movements of handling equipment at a speed that could breach a commercial SNF 
assembly as a result of the collision of handling equipment against  an SNF assembly.    
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.54)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
WP Remediation 
(continued) 
 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes  
ITS SC •  Crane lifting yokes shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no 
drop” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Cutting 
Machine 
ITS SC •  The design of the WP cutting machine shall ensure that the mass, potential drop height, 
and other characteristics of the WP cutting machine shall be such that a radiological 
release will not result should the WP cutting machine fall onto or collide with the WP on 
approach, during cutting, or on withdrawal.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.5.11)    
•  The WP cutting machine shall preclude a radiological release due to damage inflicted 
upon the WP contents during the lid cutting process.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.5.2)    
•  The WP cutting machine shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
“no failure” and “no fall down” safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event7.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The WP cutting machine shall be designed such that impacts to a WP that result in a 
rearrangement of fissile material that may occur do not lead to a criticality.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.5.11)    
 
WP Remediation 
(continued) 
 
WP/DPC Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices  
ITS SC •  Upon a loss of power, this trolley shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this trolley shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2)     
•  The trolley system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event to maintain trolley stability and prevent waste container slapdown.  In 
addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the trolley system has sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no slapdown” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Remediation 
(continued) 
WP/DPC Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  Pedestals and hold-down devices shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to 
ensure that a “no tipover” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated 
with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The trolley shall be designed with an inherent speed limit such that a collision at the 
trolley speed limit would not cause the trolley to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.61)     
•  Loaded transfer trolleys shall not derail or drop their loads.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.36)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Safeguards and Security System 
Safeguards and 
Security 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
SNF Aging System 
Cask Transfer 
 
Cask Tractor ITS SC •  The cask tractor shall be limited in speed, including stopping and preventing runaway 
situations, such that a site-specific cask being transported remains well within its design 
tolerances.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.2) 
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  The cask tractor system shall be designed to prevent runaway of the tractor under 
loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall 
demonstrate that the cask tractor system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure 
that a “no runaway” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a 
BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Transfer 
(continued) 
 
Horizontal Cask 
Transfer Trailer 
 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The design of the hydraulic ram shall ensure that it does not puncture a waste form that 
is being placed into or removed from a HAM.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.6) 
• The horizontal cask transfer trailer system shall be designed for stability and to retain the 
waste container and prevent a runaway for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the horizontal cask transfer 
trailer has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that “no slapdown” and “no runaway” 
safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic 
event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  A means to limit speed for the transfer trailer, including stopping and preventing runaway 
situations, shall be established such that a transfer cask being transported remains well 
within its design tolerances.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.2)    
•  The horizontal cask transfer trailer shall prevent release by protecting the load following 
a tipover or a collision with an object, including mobile and stationary structures, vehicles, 
and other types of waste transfer conveyances.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.3)    
•  The horizontal cask transfer trailer shall be designed such that severity of credible 
fires/explosions shall be controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such 
that they will not result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item 
D1).2 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Transfer 
(continued) 
 
 
Site-Specific Cask 
Transporter 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The site-specific cask transporter system shall be designed for stability and to retain the 
waste container and prevent a runaway for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the site-specific cask 
transporter system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that “no slapdown” and 
“no runaway” safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions associated with a 
BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  A speed limit for the site-specific cask transporter shall be established such that a 
collision with shield or airlock doors or other heavy objects does not overturn the site-
specific cask transporter or cause it to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.38)    
•  A means to limit speed for the site-specific cask transporter, including stopping and 
preventing runaway situations, shall be established such that a site-specific cask remains 
well within its design tolerances.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.2)    
•  The site-specific cask transporter shall prevent release by protecting the load following a 
tipover or a collision with an object, including mobile and stationary structures, vehicles, 
and other types of waste transfer conveyances.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.3)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this transporter shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter 
a locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this transporter shall stay in the locked mode 
until operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2) 
•  The site-specific cask transporter shall be designed such that severity of credible 
fires/explosions shall be controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such 
that they will not result in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item 
D1).2 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Cask Transfer 
(continued) 
Site-Specific 
Transfer Cask 
ITS SC •  The design of the site-specific transfer cask shall ensure that it can withstand a drop in 
the worst orientation from the combined maximum handling height and allowable speed of 
a horizontal cask transfer trailer without loss of function.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.1) 
•  The design of the site-specific transfer cask shall ensure that it can withstand extreme 
temperatures without breach.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.9) 
•  Site-specific transfer casks shall be designed for extreme straight wind.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 4.1.13, BSC 2005h Section 9; and BSC 2005f Sections 6.1.1.2) 
•  The site-specific transfer cask shall be designed to ensure nuclear criticality safety with 
optimum moderation and the most reactive waste forms.  Criticality safety will be 
maintained despite geometric rearrangements due to a drop or other handling incidents.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.4)    
 
Aging Pad 
 
 
Surface Aging 
Pad 
ITS SC •  The aging pad shall be designed to preclude inundation during the maximum probable 
flood, including the use of drainage systems such as man-made channels sized to 
transport the probable maximum flood around the pad.  (BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The aging pad shall be located to avoid placement directly over Quaternary faults with a 
potential for significant displacement.  (BSC 2005d, Section 7.3, Table 4[7]) 
•  The surface aging pad system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the surface aging 
pad system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no significant 
cracking/displacement” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated 
with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The structure shall be designed for the loads associated with the maximum observed 
hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period).  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 
and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
•  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, such that they will not result 
in a breach of a waste form container (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D1).2 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Aging Pad 
(continued) 
 
Support 
Structures 
(including Utility 
Buildings and 
Personnel 
Barriers) 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Site-Specific 
Canister 
ITS  SC •  The site-specific canister shall be designed to ensure nuclear criticality safety with 
optimum moderation and the most reactive waste forms.  Criticality safety will be 
maintained despite geometric rearrangements due to a drop or other handling incidents.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.4)    
 
Aging Cask  
 
Site-Specific 
Canister Internal 
Geometry and 
Neutron 
Absorbers 
ITS and 
ITWI 
SC •  The site-specific canister internal geometry control shall be capable of meeting loading 
conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic 
design margin to ensure that a “no criticality” safety function3 is maintained for loading 
conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Aging Cask 
(continued) 
 
 
Site-Specific Cask ITS SC •  The site-specific cask system and other vertical aging/staging systems employed shall 
be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, 
an analysis shall demonstrate that the site-specific cask system and other vertical 
aging/staging systems employed have sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that “no 
tipover” and “no breach” safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions associated 
with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The design of the site-specific cask shall ensure that it can withstand a drop in the worst 
orientation from the combined maximum handling height and allowable speed of a site-
specific cask transporter without loss of function.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.1) 
•  The thermal design of the site-specific cask shall ensure that it can withstand extreme 
temperatures without breach.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.9) 
•  Site-specific casks shall be designed for tornado missiles, extreme straight wind, and 
tornado wind.  (BSC 2005b Section 4.1.13, BSC 2005h Section 9; and BSC 2005f Sections 
6.1.1.2 and 4.2.2.3.7) 
•  Site-specific casks shall be designed to withstand the effects of ash fall from a regional 
volcanic eruption without loss of capability to perform their safety function.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.2.7) 
•  Site-specific casks shall be designed to ensure nuclear criticality safety with optimum 
moderation and the most reactive waste forms.  Criticality safety will be maintained despite 
any geometric rearrangements due to a drop or other handling incident.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.4)   
•  Site-specific casks shall have equal or lower capacities of 74 BWR assemblies or 36 
PWR assemblies.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.34) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Aging Cask 
(continued) 
Horizontal Aging 
Module 
ITS SC •  HAMs shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  
In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the HAMs have sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no collapse” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  Stationary structures such as the HAMs shall be designed for tornado missiles, extreme 
straight wind, and tornado wind.  (BSC 2005b Section 4.1.13, BSC 2005h Section 9, and 
BSC 2005f Sections 6.1.1.2 and 4.2.2.3.7) 
•  The thermal design of the HAM shall ensure that it can withstand extreme temperatures 
without breach.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.11.9) 
•  Surface facilities, including the HAMS, shall be designed to withstand the effects of ash 
fall from a regional volcanic eruption without loss of capability to perform their safety 
functions.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.7 and BSC 2005f Section 4.2.2.3.4) 
•  The facility shall be designed such that severity of credible fires/explosions shall be 
controlled, without taking credit for fire suppression systems, so that they will not result in a 
breach of a waste form container2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item D1) 
•  The structure shall be designed for the loads associated with the maximum observed 
hourly precipitation event (with a 100-year return period).  (BSC 2005f Section 6.1.1.1.2 
and BSC 2005b Section 4.3.2) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
SNF/HLW Transfer System 
WP Loadout  
 
WP Handling 
Crane (DTF, 
Room 1044); 100 
ton 
 
ITS SC 
 
•  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)     
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)    
•  The lift height limits for the sealed and unsealed, loaded WPs handled by this crane are 
provided in Table C-1 in Appendix C.  These WPs include: 
1.  Unsealed, loaded WPs containing commercial SNF, standardized DOE SNF 
canisters, DOE HLW canisters, naval SNF canisters, or DOE MCOs.   
2.  Sealed WPs containing commercial SNF, standardized DOE SNF canisters, DOE 
HLW canisters, naval SNF canisters, or DOE MCOs.   
•  This crane system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and maintain its load.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that this 
crane system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety 
function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a loaded, sealed WP.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force to breach a WP as the result 
of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.20)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Handling 
Crane (DTF, 
Room 1044); 100 
ton (continued) 
 
 
 
ITS SC 
 
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
WP Loadout 
(continued) 
 
 
WP Loadout 
Handling Crane 
(DTF Room 
1088); 100 ton 
 
ITS SC •  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)   
•  This crane system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and maintain its load.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the 
crane system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety 
function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The lift height limits for the sealed WPs handled by this crane are provided in Table C-1 
in Appendix C.  These WPs include sealed WPs containing commercial SNF, standardized 
DOE SNF canisters, DOE HLW canisters, naval SNF canisters, or DOE MCOs.   
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a loaded, sealed WP.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Loadout 
Handling Crane 
(DTF Room 
1088); 100 ton 
(continued) 
 
ITS SC •  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force to breach a WP as the result 
of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.20)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes  
ITS SC •  Crane lifting yokes shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the crane lifting yokes have 
sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety function3 is maintained 
for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
 
WP Loadout 
(continued) 
 
Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices (CHF, 
DTF, FHF) 
ITS SC •  Upon a loss of power, this trolley shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this trolley shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.2)    
•  The trolley system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event to maintain trolley stability and prevent waste container slapdown.  In 
addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the trolley system has sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no slapdown” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The trolley shall be designed with an inherent speed limit such that a collision at the 
trolley speed limit would not cause the trolley to drop its load.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.61)     
•  Pedestals and hold-down devices shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the 
pedestals and hold-down devices have sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a 
“no tipover” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM 
seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Trolleys, 
Pedestals, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices (CHF, 
DTF, FHF) 
(continued) 
ITS SC •  Loaded transfer trolleys shall not derail or drop their loads.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.36)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Machinery that handles SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the probability of 
occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from spurious 
signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event sequence 
Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
WP Loadout 
(continued) 
 
WP Tilting 
Machine (DTF, 
CHF, FHF) 
ITS SC •  The WP tilting machine system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with 
a DBGM-2 seismic event to maintain stability and prevent a WP drop or slapdown.  In 
addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the WP tilting machine system has sufficient 
seismic design margin to ensure that “no drop” and “no slapdown” safety functions3 are 
maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a 
Table IV-1) 
•  The WP tilting machine shall be designed to prevent backward slapdowns.  (BSC 2005b 
Section 5.1.1.53)    
•  The WP tilting machine shall include measures to prevent movement or release of the 
lock on WP trunnions while the WP is being lowered onto the emplacement pallet.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.53)    
•  An impact or collision between the WP tilting machine and a WP shall not breach the 
WP or cause it to fall off the emplacement pallet.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.3.10)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
WP Turntable 
(DTF, CHF, FHF) 
ITS SC •  The WP turntable system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event to maintain turntable stability and prevent WP tipover.  In addition, 
an analysis shall demonstrate that the WP turntable system has sufficient seismic design 
margin to ensure that a “no tipover” safety function3 is maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The premature actuation of the WP turntable (while holding the WP on an emplacement 
pallet) before the disengagement of the trunnion collar removal machine shall be 
precluded.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.16)    
•  An impact or collision between the WP turntable and a WP shall not breach the WP or 
cause it to fall off the emplacement pallet.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.3.10)     
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
 
WP Loadout 
(continued) 
 
Trunnion Collar 
Removal Machine 
(DTF, CHF, FHF) 
ITS SC •  The trunnion collar removal machine system shall be designed for loading conditions 
associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event to prevent slapdown of the WP.  In addition, an 
analysis shall demonstrate that the trunnion collar removal machine system has sufficient 
seismic design margin to ensure that “no slapdown” and “no breach” safety functions3 are 
maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a 
Table IV-1) 
•  The premature actuation of the WP turntable (while holding the WP on an emplacement 
pallet) before the disengagement of the trunnion collar removal machine shall be 
precluded.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.16)    
•  An impact or collision between the trunnion collar removal machine and a WP shall not 
breach the WP or cause it to fall off the emplacement pallet.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.3.10)  
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
DPC Cutting 
Machine (DTF)  
ITS SC 
 
 
•  The design of the DPC cutting machine shall ensure that the mass, potential drop height, 
and other characteristics of the cutting machine are such that a radiological release will not 
result should the cutting machine fall onto or collide with the DPC on approach, during 
cutting, or on withdrawal.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.5.3)    
•  The DPC cutting machine shall preclude a radiological release due to damage inflicted 
upon the DPC contents during the cutting process.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.5.4)    
•  The DPC cutting machine shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event and to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that 
“no failure” and “no fall down” safety functions3 are maintained for loading conditions 
associated with a BDBGM seismic event7.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The DPC cutting machine shall be designed such that impacts to a DPC do not lead to a 
criticality despite geometric rearrangements due to a drop or other handling incidents.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.5.3)    
 
DPC Cutting  
 
DPC Docking 
Station 
 
ITS SC 
 
 
•  A drop or collision involving components associated with a docking port shall not breach 
the lid of a transportation cask or site-specific cask situated at the docking port.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.17)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Dry Transfer  
 
Spent Fuel 
Transfer Machine 
and Grapples 
(DTF, FHF) 
ITS SC •  Upon a loss of power, the spent fuel transfer machine shall be designed to stop, retain 
its load, and enter a locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this machine shall stay in 
the locked mode until operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)     
•  The spent fuel transfer machine shall have a drop rate of less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 
drops/transfer, including transfers in single-assembly canisters.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.7)   
•  The spent fuel transfer machine and grapples shall be designed for loading conditions 
associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event to demonstrate sufficient seismic design margin 
to ensure that a “maintain waste form” safety function3 is maintained.  (BSC 2004a Table 
IV-1, BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.10) 
•  The rate of assembly collisions during an assembly transfer operation shall be less than 
or equal to 1 × 10-5 collisions/transfer.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.8)   
•  The probability of a drop of handling equipment onto a commercial SNF assembly with 
enough energy to breach the assembly shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-7 
impacts/transfer for each assembly transferred.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.9)    
•  The spent fuel transfer machine and anchorages shall be designed to prevent collapse 
of this system for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, 
an analysis shall demonstrate that the spent fuel transfer machine and anchorages have 
sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no fall down” safety function3 is 
maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a 
Table IV-1) 
•  The spent fuel transfer machine shall not be capable of lateral movements of handling 
equipment at a speed that could breach a commercial SNF assembly as a result of the 
collision of handling equipment against  an SNF assembly.   (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.54)   
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  Commercial SNF assemblies shall be lifted less than 28 ft above an essentially 
unyielding surface.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.46) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Dry Transfer 
(continued) 
 
Canister Handling 
Crane (DTF); 70 
ton 
ITS SC •  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)    
•  The probability of dropping handling equipment from a crane onto a canister shall be 
less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 for each canister transferred.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.11)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)    
•  The lift height limits for the canisters handled by this crane (including the DOE MCO, 
standardized DOE SNF canister, and DOE HLW canister) are provided in Table C-1 in 
Appendix C.   
•  The crane system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and maintain its load.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the 
crane system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety 
function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a standardized DOE SNF 
canister, a DOE HLW canister, or a DOE MCO.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force to breach a canister as the 
result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.20)    
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Dry Transfer 
(continued) 
 
 
 
Naval Canister 
Handling Crane 
(DTF); 70 ton 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The drop rate for cranes involved in handling waste forms and their associated 
containers shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-5 drops/transfer, regardless of cause, 
including human error, failure of equipment such as yokes and grapples, or a combination 
of the two.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.10)    
•  Upon a loss of power, this crane shall be designed to stop, retain its load, and enter a 
locked mode; upon a restoration of power, this crane shall stay in the locked mode until 
operator action is taken.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.2.1)    
•  The conditional probability of the crane exceeding a lift-height limit, given that a drop has 
occurred, shall be less than or equal to 1 × 10-4.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.12)   
•  The lift height limits for the naval SNF canisters handled by this crane are provided in 
Table C-1 in Appendix C.  
•  This crane system shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event and maintain its load.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that this 
crane system has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety 
function3 is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  
(BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
• This crane shall not be capable of moving above a speed limit for overhead crane 
transfers such that a collision at the speed limit would not breach a naval SNF canister.  
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.19)    
•  The severity of credible fires/explosions in areas where the waste forms are present 
shall not cause the handling equipment that handles SNF/HLW to drop its load.  (BSC 
2005g Table 6, Item I1) 
•  Cranes and other machinery that handle SNF/HLW shall be designed to minimize the 
probability of occurrence of uncontrolled movements resulting from a loss of power or from 
spurious signals initiated by a credible fire/explosion, such as to render a potential event 
sequence Beyond Category 2.  (BSC 2005g Table 6, Item I3) 
•  This crane shall not be capable of exerting sufficient force to breach a canister as the 
result of attempts to overcome mechanical constraints.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.20)    
 
  
N
uclear Safety D
esign B
ases for License A
pplication  
 
 
  
000-30R
-M
G
R
0-00400-000-003 
A
-75 
Septem
ber 2005 
Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes 
ITS SC •  The crane lifting yokes shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a 
DBGM-2 seismic event.  In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the crane lifting 
yokes have sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no drop” safety function3 is 
maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a 
Table IV-1) 
 
Cask/WP Docking 
Station (DTF, 
FHF) 
 
ITS SC 
 
 
 
•  A drop or collision involving components associated with a docking port shall not breach 
the lid of a transportation cask or site-specific cask situated at the docking port.  (BSC 
2005b Section 5.1.1.17)    
 
Dry Transfer 
(continued) 
 
Canister and SNF 
Staging Racks 
(DTF) 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
 
•  The canister and SNF staging racks shall be designed such that criticality safety is 
ensured for the commercial SNF assembly staging racks loaded to capacity with the most 
reactive commercial SNF assembly accepted at the repository with moderator control in 
effect.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.4.2)     
•  The canister and SNF staging racks shall be designed such that criticality safety is 
ensured for commercial SNF assemblies dropped into or onto a commercial SNF assembly 
staging rack with moderator control in effect.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.4.3)    
•  The canister and SNF staging racks shall be designed such that the most reactive 
configuration of standardized DOE SNF canisters is capable of being loaded into the 
canister staging racks (with credit for moderator control) without leading to a nuclear 
criticality.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.2)    
•  The canister and SNF staging tubes shall be designed for loading conditions associated 
with a DBGM-2 seismic event for stability and distortion such as to maintain 
assembly/canister geometry in the rack.  In addition, analyses shall demonstrate that the 
staging tubes have sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that distortion of the tubes is 
limited and stability is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic 
event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The spacing between the surfaces of DOE SNF canisters in a staging array must be 
30 cm or greater.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.3)   
•  The commercial SNF staging racks in the DTF shall withstand, without degradation of 
their confinement function, the drop of a commercial SNF assembly in the rack from the 
spent fuel transfer machine.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.4.5)   
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Dry Transfer 
(continued) 
Canister Staging 
Racks (CHF) 
ITS SC 
 
 
•  The most reactive configuration of standardized DOE SNF canisters shall be capable of 
being loaded into canister staging racks (with credit for moderator control) without causing 
a nuclear criticality.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.2)   
•  The staging racks shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 
seismic event for stability and distortion such as to maintain canister geometry in the rack.  
In addition, analyses shall demonstrate that the staging racks have sufficient seismic 
design margin to ensure that distortion of the racks is limited and stability is maintained for 
loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The spacing between the surfaces of DOE SNF canisters in a staging array must be 
30 cm or greater.  (BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.3)   
 
Subsurface Ventilation System 
Subsurface 
Ventilation 
 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Surface Industrial HVAC System 
Surface Industrial 
HVAC 
 
Inlet and Outlet 
Dampers and 
Ventilation 
Ducting (including 
stack) for Fuel 
Element Staging 
Areas (DTF) 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  The inlet and outlet dampers and ventilation ducting for the fuel element staging areas 
shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 seismic event to 
ensure that a “no failure” safety function3 is maintained.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The ventilation stack for the fuel element staging areas (DTF only) shall be designed for 
loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 seismic event to ensure that a “controlled 
failure” safety function3 is maintained.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  A loss of HVAC for up to 30 days in areas where SNF or HLW is handled or staged shall 
not cause waste form temperatures to exceed allowable limits.    (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.2.4) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Surface Industrial 
HVAC (continued) 
SSCs Other Than 
the Inlet and 
Outlet Dampers 
and Ventilation 
Ducting (including 
stack) for Fuel 
Element Staging 
Areas of DTF 
N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Surface Nuclear HVAC System 
Primary 
Confinement 
 
Entire (DTF, FHF) 
 
ITS 
 
SC 
 
•  To mitigate the worker and public doses following a Category 1 event sequence, the 
Surface Nuclear HVAC system shall be equipped with HEPA filters.  A two-stage HEPA 
filtration system with a particulate removal efficiency of at least 99% per stage is required.  
This requirement applies to the DTF and the FHF.  (BSC 2005c Section 4.1.1) 
•  The HEPA filters and vent ducts (exhaust ducting and dampers) shall be designed for 
loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 seismic event to ensure that a “no 
discharge” safety function3 is maintained.  (BSC 2004a Table IV-1) 
•  The probability that the HVAC system, including HEPA filtration in the primary 
confinement areas of the DTF and FHF, becomes unavailable during a 4-hour mission time 
shall be 0.01 or less, without credit for backup electrical power.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.48)    
•  A loss of HVAC for up to 30 days in areas where SNF or HLW is handled or staged shall 
not cause waste form temperatures to exceed allowable limits.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.2.4)    
•  HEPA filters shall continue to provide their required particulate removal efficiency when 
exposed to embers and hot gas layer temperatures resulting from a fire in the DTF or FHF 
(BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.62) 
•  The surface nuclear HVAC system shall be capable of performing its 4-hr mission of 
radiological release mitigation in the situation where primary confinement has been lost 
due to a drop of a commercial SNF assembly onto a docking ring.  (BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.63) 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Secondary 
Confinement 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
Tertiary 
Confinement 
Entire N/A Non-SC 
 
 
Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
Transportation Cask  
Transportation 
Cask  
Entire  ITS SC Transportation casks provide adequate protection against external hazards on the 
repository site.  See footnotes 1 and 4. 
 
WP Closure System 
Welding 
(Equipment) 
Entire N/A Non-SC 
 
Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Inerting 
(Equipment) 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Non-Destructive 
Testing 
(Equipment) 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Stress Mitigation 
(Equipment) 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
WP Identification Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Spread Ring 
Installation 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
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Table A-II.  Nuclear Safety Design Bases of Systems and Subsystems 
System or 
Subsystem 
 
Component 
or Function 
 
ITS or 
ITWI 
 
Safety 
Category 
 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases 
 
Material Handling Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Remote Equipment 
Maintenance 
Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
Operations Control Entire N/A Non-SC Not applicable.  None of the SSC functions associated with these subsystems are credited 
for the prevention or mitigation of an event sequence. 
 
FOOTNOTES (Applicable to both Table A-I and Table A-II): 
1.  Functions of the transportation casks are credited to prevent or mitigate event sequences.  The certification process for transportation casks under 10 CFR Part 
71 [DIRS 173375] considers severe transportation accident conditions and conditions of normal transport.  The precedent that licensed casks provide adequate 
protection against all hazards that apply during the transportation phase establishes the basis that the casks will continue to provide adequate protection at the 
repository site.  
2.  This requirement applies to the following types of waste form containers, as needed, to avoid a radioactive release: transportation casks, transfer casks, DOE 
MCOs, DOE standardized canisters, naval SFCs, DOE HLW canisters, DPCs, site-specific canisters, aging casks, and waste packages (BSC 2005g [DIRS 
174263], Table 6, Item D1).  The naval SNF canister will not be exposed to fire conditions more severe than those corresponding to a black body gas exposure 
flux of 50 kW/m2 and a temperature of 1000°C (1832°F) for 2 minutes (BSC 2005g [DIRS 174263], Section 6.2.1.2.6). 
3.  The definitions of the Safety Functions are provided in Appendix B. 
4.  Transportation casks must meet the flame emissivity and cask absorptivity requirements of 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4).  
5.  Not used. 
6.  Analyses will confirm that sealed WPs shall withstand drops onto energy-absorbing crush pads without breaching and that the impact consequences associated 
with a drop of a canister or cask onto energy-absorbing crush pads shall be equal to, or less than, the impact consequences associated with the drop of a cask or 
canister from the maximum specified drop height onto an unyielding surface. 
7.  The seismic requirements for the WP cutting machine and DPC cutting machine are specified in Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a) for the 
cutting machine listed in Table IV-1   
 
GENERAL NOTES:   
Lift height limits can be exceeded provided that energy-absorbing material is used to limit the impact energy to that of the drop height limit. 
The load drop probability includes components (lifting yokes, trunnions, and grapples) associated with the lifting and transferring of heavy loads. 
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The trolley system includes the trolley, rails, pedestal, and control system. 
The term cask refers to both the transportation cask and the site-specific cask, unless specified otherwise.   
Every facility may not use every component listed for each system. 
The term breach means an opening of the cask, canister, or WP initiating a Category 1 or Category 2 event sequence. 
 
BDBGM = beyond design basis ground motion; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DPC = dual-purpose canister; DOE = U.S. 
Department of Energy; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; FHF = Fuel Handling Facility; HAM = horizontal aging module; HLW = high-level radioactive waste; HVAC = 
heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning; HEPA = high-efficiency particulate air; ITWI = important to waste isolation; MCC = motor control center; MCO = 
multicanister overpack; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; SC = safety category; SFC = [naval] spent fuel canister; SNF = spent nuclear fuel; 
SRTC = site rail transfer cart; SSC = structure, system, or component; SSCs = structures, systems, and components; TCRRF = Transportation Cask 
Receipt/Return Facility; UPS = uninterruptable power supply; WNNRF = Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility; WP = waste package. 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFINITION OF SAFETY FUNCTIONS 
B.1 General 
Each SSC that is ITS that is credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically initiated 
event sequence is assigned a safety function (or functions) with regard to performance goals for 
the specific SSC during and after the initiating seismic event.  This appendix defines the safety 
functions used in this report.  These definitions of safety functions were obtained from Seismic 
Analysis for Preclosure Safety (BSC 2004a [DIRS 171470], Section 4). 
B.1.1 Safety Function:  No Structural Collapse 
The “no structural collapse” safety function is assigned to facilities and structures assigned to 
either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.  For seismic margin calculations, the function corresponds 
approximately to the state of “large permanent distortion, short of collapse” of a structure or 
facility, termed Limit State A.   
The “no structural collapse” safety function has the following performance goals during and after 
a seismic event: 
• No structural collapse occurs (i.e., column and support members remain upright, 
beams remain functional, and walls remain standing), and failure of the contents is 
not serious enough to cause severe injury or death, prevent evacuation, or induce a 
breach of a waste container. 
• Confinement of internal airflow is not required and may not be maintained.  
Concrete walls will remain standing, but may be extensively cracked; they may not 
maintain pressure differential with normal HVAC.  Cracks will still provide a 
tortuous path for material release.  The largest cracks are expected to be no greater 
than one-half inch.  
• Distortion of the structure will be limited, but expected to be visible to the naked 
eye. 
• Components will remain anchored, but with no assurance that they will remain 
functional or easily repairable. 
An additional requirement of this safety function is that the failure of adjacent structures and 
other SSCs (whether ITS or not) shall be considered in seismic analyses, as appropriate, and 
shall not induce collapse of the designated structure. 
B.1.2 Safety Function:  No Drop 
The “no drop” safety function is assigned to cranes assigned to a DBGM-2 level.  The no-drop 
safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
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• The crane shall not release (or drop) a waste container or waste form either due to 
failure of crane components or controls due to a designated seismic event. 
• The crane, as a system, shall not collapse or fall down.  The crane shall remain on 
its track or guide system (regardless if crane is holding a waste container or waste 
form at the time of the event). 
• Horizontal movement (swinging) of the cask or WP shall be restrained (if 
necessary) to preclude impacts with nearby walls and barriers. 
• The crane track or guide system shall remain intact and attached to the structure.  It 
may be distorted and bent, however. 
• The crane shall not move in an uncontrolled manner or exceed its design speed 
limit. 
B.1.3 Safety Function:  No Breach 
The “no breach” safety function is assigned to various waste containers assigned to either a 
DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. 
The no breach (leak tight) safety function has the following performance goals during and after a 
seismic event: 
• Containment of the waste form is maintained and no release or dispersement of 
radionuclides (either as gas or particulates) to the environment occurs. 
• Distortion and damage of the container will be limited. 
B.1.4 Safety Function:  No Tipover  
The “no tipover” safety function is assigned to various SSCs handling casks and canisters (e.g., 
turntables and pedestals) assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.  The no tipover safety 
function has the following performance goal during and after a seismic event: 
• The SSC shall not allow a tipover of a cask or canister (i.e., an overturn from an 
upright or normal position and impact the floor, ground, or other object), or tilting 
of the cask or canister resulting in an impact with an adjacent SCC that is ITS 
causing a domino effect. 
B.1.5 Safety Function:  No Slapdown 
The “no slapdown” safety function is assigned to various SSCs handling casks and canisters 
(e.g., trolleys, WP transporters, transport locomotives, horizontal aging modules, site-specific 
cask transporters) assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.  The no slapdown safety 
function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
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• The SSC shall not allow a slapdown or rapid drop of a cask or WP in transit (i.e., 
the fall of a cask or WP, a vertical distance and subsequent impact onto the floor, 
ground, or onto another object). 
• Any impacts to the cask or WP shall be within design specifications and, thereby, 
not induce a breach of the cask or WP in transit. 
• The SSC itself may sustain substantial damage and may no longer be operable. 
B.1.6 Safety Function:  No Release  
The “no release” safety function is assigned to staging and storage racks assigned to either a 
DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.   
The no release safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic 
event: 
• No release or dispersement of radionuclides (either as gas and/or as particulates) to 
the environment due to shaking or deformation of the waste form or storage rack. 
• Distortion and damage of the waste form and rack(s) will be limited and will not 
preclude additional operations to retrieve the waste forms. 
B.1.7 Safety Function:  No Failure 
The “no failure” safety function is assigned to various SSCs (e.g., limiters, collars, dampers) 
assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.  The no failure safety function has the following 
performance goal during and after a seismic event: 
• The SSC will continue its designated safety function after a seismic event without 
significant degradation in the performance.  For structural elements, the load 
response shall be essentially elastic due to the seismic event. 
B.1.8 Safety Function:  No Significant Cracking/Displacement  
The “no significant cracking/displacement” safety function is assigned to aging pads at the 
DBGM-2 level.  The no significant cracking/displacement safety function has the following 
performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
• Aging pad is essentially intact.  The concrete will remain structurally sound, but 
may contain several small cracks.  The largest cracks are expected to be no greater 
than one-eighth inch and lengths shorter than 2 feet. 
• Distortion of the pad will be very limited and not expected to be immediately 
apparent to the naked eye. 
• Differential displacement across the pad shall be minimal, with differential 
displacements insufficient to cause a tipover of individual storage casks. 
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B.1.9 Safety Function:  Controlled Failure 
The “controlled failure” safety function is assigned in special instances to SSCs (e.g., ventilation 
stacks) to preclude potential interactions with SSCs that are ITS.  The controlled failure safety 
function has the following performance goals for ventilation stacks during and after a seismic 
event: 
• Failure of an SSC due to a seismic event shall not obstruct an open flow path to the 
environment of the corresponding ventilation system. 
• Failure of an SSC shall not impede the safety function of another SSC that is ITS. 
B.1.10 Safety Function:  Shielding Integrity Remains Intact 
The “shielding integrity remains intact” safety function is assigned to shielding SSCs (e.g., shield 
view ports, shield windows, shield doors) at the DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 levels.  The shielding 
integrity remains intact safety function has the following performance goals during and after a 
seismic event: 
• The SSC remains essentially intact and in-place, and provides sufficient (direct 
shine) shielding to permit workers to egress the area without receiving a significant 
dose (“significant” is defined as less than 10 percent of the worker dose limit). 
• Cracking of glass will be limited, and drainage of fluids (used in ports and windows 
for shielding) will be slow. 
B.1.11 Safety Function:  Maintain Waste Form 
The “maintain waste form” safety function is assigned to fuel handling machines at either the 
DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.  The maintain waste form safety function has the following 
performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
• The SSC continues to maintain (retain) the waste form. 
• The waste form remains intact and in-place. 
• Damage to the waste form is minimal. 
• Significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (either as gas and/or as 
particulates) to the environment due to shaking or deformation of the waste form is 
precluded. 
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B.1.12 Safety Function:  No Criticality  
The “no criticality” safety function is assigned to various waste containers (e.g., casks, canisters, 
WPs) and staging and storage racks assigned to DBGM-2 level. 
For various waste containers, the no criticality safety function has the following performance 
goals during and after a seismic event: 
• The waste in the container shall remain subcritical as a result of a drop or impact 
within design limits with the most reactive credible configuration of the fissile 
material and moderation to the most reactive credible extent. 
• The container internal geometry shall retain the design waste configuration with 
only minor damage/distortion.  
For staging and storage racks, the no criticality safety function has the following performance 
goal during and after a seismic event: 
• The rack shall remain structurally intact (with minimal distortion of the rack) and 
prevent bare fuel assemblies (or other exposed waste forms) from becoming critical 
as a result, considering the most reactive credible configuration of the fissile 
material and moderation to the most reactive credible extent. 
B.1.13 Safety Function:  No Runaway 
The “no runaway” (uncontrolled descent) safety function is assigned to transporters and 
locomotives assigned to the DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 levels.  The no runaway safety function has 
the following performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
• The SSC shall stop the transport train (the trailer/car containing a waste form) after 
a seismic event (however, a tipover is not precluded). 
• The SSC shall not allow the speed of the transport train to exceed its maximum 
allowable limits. 
• The coupler shall remain connected between the locomotive and transport train. 
B.1.14 Safety Function:  No Discharge  
The “no discharge” safety function is assigned to SSCs such as vent ducts, as well as HEPA 
filters and filter housings, which can contain a significant particulate dose and are assigned to 
either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.   
For filters, the no discharge safety function has the following performance goals during and after 
a seismic event: 
• No significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (particulates) to the 
immediate environment (to the structure interior or exterior) due to shaking of the 
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filter and/or deformation of the filter (housing) system occurs.  A significant release 
is defined as a release that results in less than a small fraction of the applicable dose 
limit over a period of 24 hours. 
• No significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (particulates) back into the 
interior ventilation system (i.e., no back flow); this shall be precluded by 
valves/dampers or other appropriate devices. 
• External components of the system (e.g., housings and fans) shall be rigidly 
anchored to major building elements (walls, floors, partitions). 
• The system shall maintain its structural integrity, and distortion/damage of the 
housing and hangers (if applicable) will be limited. 
For vent ducts, the no discharge safety function has the following performance goals during and 
after a seismic event: 
• No significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (particulates) to the 
immediate environment.  A significant release is defined as a release that results in 
less than a small fraction of the applicable dose limit over a period of 24 hours, and 
analyses shall consider potential accumulations within the duct re-entering the air 
stream. 
• The duct shall maintain effective confinement of internal airflow with minimal 
outflow through joints. 
• The duct shall maintain its structural integrity, and distortion/damage of the duct 
and hangers will be limited. 
B.1.15 Safety Function:  No Derailment  
The “no derailment” safety function is assigned to trolley rails and rail tracks, which are assigned 
to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. 
The no derailment safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic 
event: 
• No significant structural deformation of the rail occurs (i.e., the rails will not shear, 
heave, or warp) that is serious enough to cause a derailment or tipover of any waste 
transporter on the rail (e.g., WP trolley). 
• No significant failure of the rail occurs (e.g., shearing, separation) that could induce 
a derailment if a transporter would pass over the damaged section. 
• Distortion of the rail will be limited and not expected to be immediately apparent to 
the naked eye. 
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• The rail will remain, for the most part, anchored and functional (or easily 
repairable). 
• The rail system shall not impede the braking of any waste transporter on the rail. 
B.1.16 Safety Function:  No Fall Down 
The “no fall down” safety function is assigned to large equipment (spent fuel handling machines, 
welders) that could impact SSCs if the specific equipment loses its anchorage and falls due to a 
seismic event.  These SSCs can be assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level.   
The no fall down safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic 
event: 
• The equipment, as a system, shall not collapse or fall down.  The equipment shall 
remain on its track/guide system (if present). 
• Anchorage for the equipment shall maintain the equipment in-place. 
B.1.17 Safety Function:  No Loss of Confinement 
The “no loss of confinement” safety function is assigned to facilities and structures assigned to 
either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level where structural integrity and confinement after the seismic 
event must be credited for compliance or added for defense-in-depth.  For seismic margin 
calculations, the function corresponds to the state of limited permanent distortion of a structure 
or facility, termed Limit State C. 
In the present dose consequence analysis, no credit is taken for confinement for limiting offsite 
dose to the public and, thereby, this safety function is not used.  This definition was added for 
completeness.   
The no loss of confinement safety function has the following performance goals during and after 
a seismic event: 
• No structural collapse occurs (i.e., column and support members remain upright, 
beams remain functional, and walls remain standing), and failure of contents is not 
serious enough to cause severe injury or death, prevent evacuation, or induce a 
breach of a waste container. 
• Confinement of internal airflow is required and will be maintained.  Concrete walls 
will remain standing, but may be cracked.  This cracking however, is small enough 
to maintain the pressure differential with normal HVAC.  The largest cracks are 
expected to be no greater than approximately one-eighth in.  
• Distortion of the structure will be very limited and not expected to be immediately 
apparent to the naked eye. 
• Components will remain anchored and functional or easily repairable. 
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An additional requirement of this safety function is that the failure of adjacent structures and 
other SSCs (whether safety-related or not) shall be considered in seismic analyses as appropriate 
and shall not induce collapse of the designated structure. 
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APPENDIX C 
LIFT HEIGHT LIMITS FOR WASTE FORMS 
The various casks, canisters, SNF assemblies, and WPs to be handled in the repository surface 
facilities shall be lifted by the various cranes in these facilities in accordance with the limits 
specified in Table C-1.  The rationale for the establishment of each of these limits is provided in 
the stated reference, which describes in detail why each limit is required and what limitations and 
assumptions are applicable. 
Table C-I.  Lift Height Limits 
Confinement Contents Lift Height Limit(s) (Note 1) Reference 
Transportation cask 
with impact limiters 
Any waste form 30 ft in the worst orientation above an 
essentially unyielding flat surface 
 
BSC 2005b Sections 4.2.1, 
5.1.9.1 
DOE MCO 2 ft in any orientation above an essentially 
unyielding flat surface unless impact 
absorption feature is credited 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.18 
Naval SNF Canister 16 ft in any orientation above an 
essentially unyielding flat surface 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.18
Transportation cask 
without impact 
limiters 
 
 
Any other waste form 23 ft in any orientation above an 
essentially unyielding flat surface 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.18
Transfer Casks DPC 23 ft in vertical orientation from the floor 
of the transportation cask or  
site-specific cask2  
and 
2 ft in vertical orientation above the floor 
of the transfer cell 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.43
Site-specific cask Commercial SNF. 
DPC, Site-Specific 
Canister, 
Standardized DOE 
SNF Canisters, or 
DOE HLW Canisters
23 ft in any orientation above an 
essentially unyielding flat surface 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.18
DPC 23 ft in vertical orientation from the floor 
of the transportation cask, transfer 
cask, or site-specific cask2  
and 
2 ft in vertical orientation above the floor 
of the transfer cell 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.43Unconfined 
 
Site-Specific  
Canister 
23 ft in vertical orientation from the floor 
of the WP or site-specific cask2  
and 
2 ft in vertical orientation above the floor 
of the transfer cell 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.43
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Table C-I.  Lift Height Limits (continued) 
Confinement Contents Lift Height Limit(s) (Note 1) Reference 
Unconfined 
(continued) 
Commercial SNF 
Assembly 
28 ft above an essentially unyielding 
surface 
BSC 2005b Section 
5.1.1.46 
 Standardized DOE 
SNF Canister 
23 ft in an approximately vertical 
orientation above the floor of a cask, WP, 
staging rack, or staging pit 
and 
2 ft above the floor of the transfer cell 
(any orientation) 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.14 
 DOE MCO 23 ft in vertical orientation (within 3 
degrees of vertical orientation) onto an 
essentially flat unyielding surface (floor of 
a cask or WP) 
and 
2 ft in any orientation above an essentially 
unyielding flat surface (floor of transfer 
cell) 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.15 
 DOE HLW Canister 23 ft in vertical orientation above the floor 
of a cask, WP, staging rack or staging pit2
and 
2 ft above the floor of the transfer cell 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.24
 Naval SNF Canister 28 ft in vertical orientation above the floor 
of a cask or WP2  
and 
2 ft above the floor of the transfer cell 
where the orientation is not considered to 
be vertical 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.42
Waste package  
(sealed; trunnion 
collars installed) 
Naval Long SNF 
Canister 
3.3 ft in vertical orientation onto an 
essentially unyielding flat surface  
and 
1.6 ft for tipover from an elevated surface 
onto an essentially unyielding flat surface
BSC 2005b Sections 5.1.3.12 
and 5.1.3.9 
 Any waste form 7.8 ft in a horizontal orientation onto an 
essentially unyielding flat surface  
and 
6.5 ft in a vertical orientation over an 
essentially unyielding flat surface (except 
naval long WP) as measured from the 
bottom of the WP 
and 
6.5 ft for tipover from an elevated surface 
onto an essentially unyielding flat surface 
(except naval long WP) 
BSC 2005b Sections 5.1.3.12 
and 5.1.3.9 
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Table C-I.  Lift Height Limits (continued) 
Confinement Contents Lift Height Limit(s) (Note 1) Reference 
Waste package  Any waste form 6.5 ft from bottom of the pallet to an 
essentially unyielding flat surface, in a 
horizontal orientation 
BSC 2005b Sections 5.1.3.8 
and 5.1.3.12 
DOE MCO / DOE 
HLW Canister 
2 ft above an essentially unyielding flat 
surface for drops in which the WP may 
topple and overturn or slap down 
and 
23 ft for flat-bottom drops (axis of the 
canister is 3 degrees of vertical) above an 
essentially unyielding flat surface (e.g., in 
a WP loading pit) such that the WP 
remains upright  
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.52 
Commercial SNF 2 ft above an essentially unyielding flat 
surface for drops in which the WP may 
topple and overturn or slap down 
and 
28 ft for flat-bottom drops above an 
essentially unyielding flat surface (e.g., in 
a WP loading pit) such that the WP 
remains upright 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.52
Naval SNF Canister 2 ft above an essentially unyielding flat 
surface for drops in which the WP may 
topple and overturn or slap down 
and 
16 ft for a flat-bottom drop onto an 
essentially unyielding surface (e.g., in a 
WP loading pit) where the WP remains 
upright 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.52
Site-Specific  
Canister 
23 ft in vertical orientation from the floor 
of the WP or site-specific cask2  
and 
2 ft in vertical orientation above the floor 
of the transfer cell 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.43
Waste package  
(unsealed) 
 
DOE HLW Canister / 
DOE SNF Canister 
23 ft for flat-bottom drops above an 
essentially unyielding flat surface (e.g., in 
a WP loading pit) such that the WP 
remains upright 
and 
2 ft above an essentially unyielding flat 
surface for drops in which the WP may 
topple and overturn or slap down 
BSC 2005b Section 5.1.1.52
 
Note 1:  These lift height limits can be exceeded if an appropriate impact absorption feature is credited. 
Note 2:  A breach of the wasteform is assumed if the wasteform is dropped from higher than the stated lift height. 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases for License Application    
 
 
000-30R-MGR0-00400-000-003 C-4 September 2005 
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